ORGANIZATION OF THE KINGDOM OF JERUSALEM UNDER AMALRIC I (1163-1174)

by

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June 1969

A dissertation in the Department of History submitted to the faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at New York University.

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PREFACE

In the earlier treatment of Outremer in the twelfth century, a constantly reiterated theme has been that of the strong monarchical development which reached its zenith under the rule of Amalric I (1163-1174). This is the view held by Röhricht, Schlumberger, Lane-Poole, Rey, La Monte, Runciman, Grousset, Longnon, Baldwin, Riley-Smith and Cahen's earlier work - La Syrie du Nord à l'époque des Croisades et la Principauté franque d'Antioche. Since more recent research has considerably modified this view, a re-examination of the institutional development of Outremer is in order. The new research was initiated by J. Prawer in some ten articles substantially re-examining or altering the older viewpoint. These ideas received support from Richard and Cahen's recent article, "La féodalite et les institutions politiques de l'Orient latin."

This study presents the role of Amalric as king, including his influence on laws and institutions. Personal noble ambitions, Moslem disunity, Italian merchant assistance, crusader feudalism, the influence of the Levant, castles, colonization activities and the Jewish communities, the role of the appendage states and the influence of Manuel I Comnenus are also noted. Amalric's foreign policy, which consisted chiefly of attempts at conquering Egypt, is discussed.

Frankish squabbles over the direction their activities should take stalemated any effective action and doomed Amalric's southern venture.

There is a review of the constitutional developments within the kingdom under Amalric's rule. Particular emphasis is placed on the background for Amalric's Assise sur la ligece. Amalric's issuance of this assize in 1163 is of great significance in the strong monarch - weak monarch interpretations. Weakened royal power in the period 1131-1163 was paralleled by a strengthened and stabilized noble influence and class identification. The Assise sur la ligece must be viewed against the background of this rising noble political influence and seen as a predictable development. Detailed examination of the earlier Assise de Teneure and the Assise de Vente reveals their issuance in order to safeguard the military needs of the state. That the latter assize allowed the circumvention of the former conditions our study of the Assise sur la ligece - Amalric's assize was directed at guaranteeing the kingdom's military strength. Since it was issued with baronial approval, thereby emphasizing baronial political influence, the Assise sur la ligece may be viewed as terminating the royal right to dispossess vassals without due judgment in the Haute Cour. The assize actions requiring bourgeois fealty oaths and rear-vassal immediatizing are seen as codifying already existing practices and, thereby, further emphasizing baronial political influence. The resultant picture of Amalric as king shows the appearance of a strong monarch without the attendant authority.

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CHAPTER I

CRUSADING BACKGROUND

1. Crusading Movement

Among the reasons for the first crusades one must note that they occurred in an age when medieval religious enthusiasm was at its zenith. Perhaps the chief word characterizing the initial crusade climate is "enthusiasm,"[1] although this will later shift to indignation and a desire for revenge. Latin monasticism expanded at a rapid rate in this period with a hastening of men and women from all social levels to join in service for Christendom. Urban II's appeal to the laity, particularly the noble military elite, to serve their religion by reconquering Jerusalem received widespread acceptance.[2] The enthusiasm of the western invaders of the Levant was not directed toward supporting the Byzantine Empire, already weakened by the successive inroads made by the Croats, Serbs, Patzinaks, Seljuk Turks and the Normans of Italy. The expectation of the Latins was that by fighting a war of righteousness they would, at the same time, successfully establish their material ambitions. The knight might now use his military skill to carve out a feudal patrimony, the merchant might now use his resources of skill and wealth to expand his trading influence and fortune and the cleric might now establish for himself some measure of ecclesiastical control.

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[1] Pierre Jonin, "Le climat de croisade des chansons de geste," Cahiers de civilization mèdièvale, VII - 3(July-September, 1964), 280.

[2] Crusade origins have been the subject of wide attention. The holy war ideas expressed by C. Erdmann, Die Entstehung des Kreuzzugsgedanken (Stuttgart, 1935), have been re-examined by M. W. Baldwin, "Some Recent Interpretations of Pope Urban's Eastern Policy," Catholic Historical Review, XXV (1940), 459-466. Urban II's policies have been analyzed by several historians: M. Villey, La Croisade: Essai sur la formation d'une thèorie juridique (Paris, 1942) credits Urban with organizing the Crusade as an arm of Christendom; F. Chalandon, Histoire de la premiere croisade (Paris, 1925) states that over-emphasis of Clermont's effect on initiating the crusades must be placed in perspective by noting papal preparations and crusade precedents; A. C. Krey, "Urban's Crusade, Success

What was there that impelled men to go on the crusades? Undoubtedly, the medieval agricultural revolution - the heavy plow, the open-field system, the triennial rotation of

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or Failure?" American Historical Review, LIII (1948), 235-250, claims that union with the Orthodox Church was foremost in Urban's plans; A. Fliche, "Urban II et la croisade," Revue de l'histoire de l'église de France, XIII (1927), 289-306, ascribes Urban's crusade decision to the warm reception he received in France; L. C. MacKinney, "The People and Public Opinion in the Eleventh-Century Peace Movement," Speculum, V (1930), 181-206 notes a papal desire to redirect the military interests of the nobility for the benefit of Christendom: W. Porges, "The Clergy, the Poor, and the Non-Combatants on the First Crusade," Speculum, XXI (1946), 2, shows Urban's vain attempt to restrict crusade participation to the military class; F. Duncalf, "The Pope's Plan for the First Crusade," The Crusades and Other Historical Essays Presented to D. C. Munro (New York, 1928), pp. 44-56; J. H. Hill, "Raymond of Saint-Gilles in Urban's Plan of Greek and Latin Friendship," Speculum, XXVI (1951), 265-265; S. Runciman, A History of the Crusades, vol. I: The First Crusade (Cambridge, 1951).

crops, the rigid collar/lateral traces harness for horses and the nailed horseshoe - allowed the cultivation of the non-Mediterranean plains of Europe so that, by the eleventh century, the unprecedented food surpluses were reflected in a rapid population increase. The tempo of manufacture, commerce and finance also accelerated to produce a new pattern of urban bourgeois life. Despite famines and plagues, the population burgeoned so that a surplus for emigration was present. This surplus population pressure not only supplied settlers, but also fighting men in the eleventh through thirteenth centuries.[3]

Further consideration may very well have been the privileges and immunities afforded the crusaders and recognized by both civil and ecclesiastical law. The major grant of indulgence, noted in 1095 at Clermont and frequently repeated, remitted penance due for confessed and contrite sins. However, the popular notion of this grant was far more sweeping and included martyrdom for dead crusaders - death was a key to the salvation promised in Church teachings. From the simple oath-taking, which some considered to be a sufficient act of devotion not necessarily requiring fulfillment, the crusader received important additional spiritual benefits - prevention from excommunication, permission to deal with excommunicants, absolution for most sins and the possible opportunity for irregular marriage.

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[3] Robert Reynolds, "The Mediterranean Frontiers, 1000-1400," The Frontier in Perspective (ed. W.D. Wyman and C. B. Kroeber, Univ. of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1957), pp. 25-26.

Important additional benefits received included: clerics and laymen were allowed to retain their incomes while receiving a moratorium on all debts which severely restricted their debtors; road taxes were not applicable to them; all were entitled to trial in the ecclesiastical courts where they were generously treated; papal protection afforded a guarantee for the safety of their person, property and family by appointing executors and guardians to protect these rights. Certainly the vagaries of the crusade and its many perils were sufficient to require some privileges - one went on a dangerous journey with the only possible ends being death far from home or return with a much poorer future although the remote possibility of territorial and material acquisition did exist. Yet, at the same time, these privileges were weighty inducements to further the Mediterranean frontier expansion as evidenced by the numbers of crusaders crowding the roads of Europe.

In attacking a Moslem world twisted in internal war, the crusaders were most fortunate. The newly victorious Seljuk Turks, now controlling the Sunnite Abbasid caliphate at Baghdad were expanding westward against the established Shiite Fatimid caliphate at Cairo which was already in the process of decaying. Syria and Palestine were the spheres of conflict and the Egyptians had just recaptured Jerusalem when the crusaders arrived. Conquering Antioch in 1098, the crusaders penetrated the Holy Land in a coastal march which diverted the Fatimid armies southward to protect the Egyptian borders. Jerusalem was occupied with relative ease in July 1099.

Personal ambition dominated the free-for-all grab for land which now occurred. The Norman leader, Bohemond, claimed Antioch and hastened to conquer the surrounding areas, Baldwin of Bouillon became heir to the Armenian rulers of Edessa and Raymond of Saint-Gilles secured the county of Tripoli. Godfrey of Bouillon, duke of Lower Lorraine, was elected ruler with the title, Defender of the Holy Sepulchre. His death in 1100 brought about the election of his brother Baldwin as king. The establishment of the monarchy was now to begin.

Although many knights had served in the initial crusade and several had settled in the country establishing their feudal possessions, most crusaders returned to Europe after the capture of Jerusalem. Baldwin, therefore, could count on only several hundred knights to defend the kingdom with several thousand Latin foot soldiers. This was the foundation of the Latin military strength - the career crusaders. Help was needed to secure the major cities of Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa and Ramleh and to attack the many coastal towns still in Moslem hands. The Italian cities, for a large price, filled this need. Genoa aided in the capture of Caesarea (1101), Tartous (1102), Acre and Jubail (1104) and Tripoli (1109); Venice assisted at Beyrouth and Sidon (1110) and Tyre (1124); Pisa aided Antioch against Laodicea. In this way, the Italians established trading outlets where exports could be obtained and exchanged for commodities needed elsewhere.[4]

The frontier cities of Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Damascus remained in Moslem control. The kingdom's defenses were, therefore, centered in the Lebanon mountain ranges and the Jordan River. The crusaders were not principally engaged in establishing definite frontier lines to divide themselves from their neighbors. Their problem in establishing control was one of building and outfitting fortresses and capturing towns from which they could dominate the immediate area.

Strategic castles guarded the vital routes through the mountains and across the rivers and streams. Belfort and Toron protected the valley of the Litany; the counts of Tripoli guarded the Eleutheros valley passage between Homs and Tripoli with the castles of Krak des Chevaliers (Hospitallers), Chastel-Blanc (Safad) and Aarka while protecting the Esdraelon plain approach road from Damascus with the defenses of Tiberias (controlling the Jacob's Ford passage south of Lake Huleh and the Samakh passage south of Lake Tiberias). Impregnable fortresses were preferred since there were insufficient forces to maintain any large-scale military activities, as previously noted. We should, therefore, consider an engagement of one dozen knights as an important battle, fifty knights as a major contest and over one hundred knights as open warfare. Naturally, the shortage of numbers often determined the extent of crusader activities. Since walled towns and fortresses were the military bases upon which the crusaders' existence depended, the history of the Latin kingdom is primarily one of continuous conflict over these vital fortified centers - initially to capture them and then to hold on to them.

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[4] *Ibid*.

Encircled by a large and basically hostile native population, the small number of western fighting men were faced with a serious problem. However, a safety factor did exist in that, owing to their own disunity, the Moslem leaders were not immediately willing to contest the Latin beachhead. Moslem disunity, a major factor in the initial successes of the crusaders, now allowed the Latin states the comparative security necessary to establish themselves in the area.

To defend itself, the kingdom relied upon diverse sources of manpower. If their continued existence rested upon themselves, the crusaders' history would probably have been abbreviated. Fortunately, annual reinforcements by pilgrims from western Europe strengthened the military position of the resident Europeans. While some pilgrims permanently settled in the Levant, most willingly assisted the crusader armies for brief periods of time thereby providing a vital manpower reserve. Some natives served in the armies as mercenaries as did mercenary troops recruited in Europe. The military orders of the Temple and the Hospital gradually gained prominence in the East after 1118 by providing large, stable, well-equipped and highly-trained troops. The members of the military orders, chiefly knights who had taken the tripartite monastic oath - poverty, chastity and obedience - devoted the major portion of their chivalric/monastic communal activities to the military life.

Reinforcements were secured in periods of crisis by appealing to the religious conscience of Europe's nobility, although the opportunities for worldly enrichment and lordly possessions were not unmentioned.

The Latin Kingdom led a precarious existence much of the time, finding it most difficult for its four parts - Jerusalem, Antioch, Edessa and Tripoli - to cooperate even in the face of major external pressures. Jerusalem, the largest and most important of the Latin states, worked out a royal system of government based upon the exploitation of the land by native peasants under crusader control. Since agricultural productivity in Palestine was not overly rewarding, an absolute economic necessity developed for trade and commerce within the Latin states and with their Moslem neighbors. Streams of caravans, merchants and traders from the inland cities moved to and through the kingdom. The Italian cities established market places and trading quarters in the coastal cities where, enjoying privileged positions, they conducted businesses which profited themselves as well as the crusader kings, princes and their feudal vassals. Feudalism was the basic political organization but it was a feudalism based upon taxation and the profits of trade, as will be discussed later, rather than the western European feudalism based upon manorial agricultural exploitation.

War was, therefore, avoided whenever possible since it interrupted trade and communication with the Moslem merchant suppliers to the Levantine trade. To be sure, occasional battles occur largely as a result of the over-exposure to hostile powers. These were of no great danger as long as they were smaller engagements with minor Moslem leaders. However, the major peril lay in opposing a strong combination of Moslem powers and on these occasions the very existence of the kingdom called for joint action by the several principalities. Unfortunately, although the Christian leaders understood the need, petty domestic quarrels between them made mutuality of action more honored in the breach. When the Moslems do unite to attack one of the crusader states, therefore, Christian disunity allows a significant Islamic success. The occasion was on hand in 1144 when Edessa fell to the forces of the atabeg of Mosul, Zengi, to be discussed later. This Moslem leader, after controlling Mosul in 1127, acquired authority over much of the Syrian Moslem world. Concentrating his federated armies against the most exposed Christian area, Zengi found Edessa's count (Joscelin II) warring with a needed ally, the prince of Antioch, and the count of Tripoli disinterested in Edessan affairs. In addition, the government of the kingdom was undergoing a change upon the death of King Fulk with his Queen Melisende acting as joint ruler and regent for the thirteen year old Baldwin III. Only the small forces of Edessa vainly stood before Zengi's success.

The fall of Edessa in 1144 brought an immediate call for a second crusade to secure Outremer's weakened northern borders. In the forefront of this crusade fervor was one of Europe's leading eccelesiastics, Bernard of Clairvaux. Yet, because of the divisions among the crusade participants and a lack of agreement within the kingdom on the immediate actions to be taken, the Second Crusade produced little of value. In choosing between punishing the Zengid successor Nūr-ad-Dīn's Aleppan forces for the disaster at Edessa or attacking the friendly neighboring emir of Damascus, the crusade leaders mistakenly chose the latter. The result was to weaken further the kingdom's border defenses since the Damascene ruler, long an enemy of Nūr-ad-Dīn and an ally of the crusaders, now lost his city to the ascending power of Aleppo. Nūr-ad-Dīn was now able to move against Egypt secured by his ability to divert the Christian forces by attacking along any or all borders of the kingdom.

2. Careers: Baldwin III and Nūr-ad-Dīn

Baldwin III's activities (1143-1163) presaged interest on the part of the Crusader monarchs and nobles in developments throughout the Latin Orient. The conquest of Ascalon on August 22, 1152 signalled the start of a new, southward orientation for Outremer; this was a policy that would dominate the activities of Amalric I as a king. Nūr-ad-Dīn's role is also one of preparing future policy; his conquest of Edessa in 1144 signalled the start of a new two-pronged plan of attacking the infidel beachhead. This policy of constantly applied pressure on the northern borders of the Outremer while forcing control over Fatimid Egypt to the south was to dominate Nūr-ad-Dīn's career and, entrusted to Saladin, proved most effective in isolating the Christian community.

In the period 1150-1152,[5] Baldwin III arranged for his coronation as sole ruler of the kingdom of Jerusalem and the termination of the regency of his mother Queen Melisende. Melisende's regency had maintained a strengthened royal position although her alliance with the more locally-concerned Ibelin family aroused opposition among the older noble families. Baldwin openly challenged his mother for power and his extensive support among the nobility brought him his inheritance. Shortly thereafter, on August 22, 1152, the royal forces captured Ascalon and it was entrusted to the king's brother, Amalric. The latter controlled Jaffa as well and, therefore, became most familiar with this area.

Baldwin's reign saw regular royal involvement in the activities of Tripoli and Antioch as part of the general concern for protecting the kingdom's northern borders against the Aleppan advances. Nūr-ad-Dīn countered the Ascalon victory by swiftly attacking and capturing Damascus in April 1154 before the Christian forces arrived to assist the emir Mujir-ad-Dīn. The crusaders were now faced on three borders by a Moslem world united under one ruler. Baldwin busied himself in 1156-1160 protecting the kingdom from a series of widely scattered raids while searching for some additional strengthened position from which he could balance the Islamic success. Battles were fought near Damascus, Banyas and Shaizar in this period. The capping of this search resulted in developing close ties with the Byzantine emperor Manuel I Comnenus during 1158-1159. In 1158, Baldwin married Manuel's niece, Theodora, exercised his diplomatic skill in reconciling the Cicilian ruler Toros with Manuel and, as a result, Baldwin became a part of the balance of power maintained by Byzantine diplomacy. Continuous joint Byzantine-crusader action against the Aleppan power was not to be, however. Manuel's diplomatic scheme called for the subordination of all minor powers in the area to his imperial domination. As such, Nūr-ad-Dīn's continued existence provided a pressure on the Latin states which would cause them to be more closely linked to Manuel's armies and ambitions.

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[5] William of Tyre, *Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum* (*RHC*, *Occ*., I and tr. E. A. Babcock and A. C. Krey, *A History of Deeds Done Beyond the Sea: by William Archbishop of Tyre* (Columbia Univ., New York, 1943) XVII, 13, 14 (*H*. *Cr*., *Occ*., I, 799-781) notes coronation preceding the siege of Edessa in 1150; dates 1151-1152 supported by: W. Stevenson, *The Crusaders in the East* (Cambridge, 1906), p. 152; Röhricht, *Geschichte . . .*, pp. 265 ff.; La Monte, *Feudal Monarchy . . .*, pp. 16-18; WT, II, 205 n. 9; Runciman, *Crusades . . .*, II, 333-334.

Continuing the diplomatic wooing of Baldwin in 1160-1161, Manuel requested that Baldwin select Raymond of Tripoli's sister or Maria of Antioch to be his imperial consort. Although Baldwin and the Latin barons selected and outfitted the former, Manuel instead chose the latter thereby gaining another link for his claim of suzerainty over Antioch. Although this marriage did not fit Baldwin's plans of preserving Antiochene independence from Byzantium, the king did not wish endangering the benefits expected from the alliance with Manuel.

When Baldwin died on February 10, 1163 he could be satisfied that his reign had managed to maintain the kingdom's northern borders while expanding southward. His reign had begun with the disastrous loss of Edessa and the ineffective Second Crusade but now ended with the possibility of a Byzantine alliance designed to secure the Latin foothold.

As noted earlier, the Moslem world lay in contest between the Cairo and Baghdad caliphates. This was further complicated by the steady dissolution of the mid-eleventh century Seljuk empire so that the first crusaders had found their way into the Holy Land eased by the weakened position of the Syrian leaders. Moslem hostility to the crusader advance was confused and limited by their regional concerns and petty jealousies as well as by their viewing the Christians as but another usurper of Syrian power, like the Turks. Furthermore, the Christian securing of the coastal regions added to the relative weakness of the Syrian Moslem leaders. The Fatimid defensive position during this period was largely the result of the retrograde evolution of her governmental structure - the central government was steadily surrendering its powers to the local authorities.

Against the background noted above, the future prominence of the Moslem leader ruling the Mesopotamian-Syrian area between Mosul and Aleppo was assured. Like the exposed Latin northeastern county of Edessa, Aleppo's location west of the Euphrates opened her to attack from Christian and Moslem alike. The rulers of Antioch, Edessa, Damascus and Mosul alternately vied for the Aleppan fulcrum about which control of Syria revolved. A Mosul-Aleppo union was effected in 1125 by the Mosul governor, Aksingur al-Bursuki, only to be broken in 1127 when Aleppo rebelled. The Baghdad sultan Mahmud appointed 'Imad-ad-Din Zengi as governor of Mosul and atabeg - "guardian" - for the Seljuk princes Alp Arslan and Farrukh Shah. Zengi, a relative of al-Bursuki, was formerly military head of the district of Iraq and now used his skill to swiftly re-establish the ties with Aleppo. Reluctant confirmation of his conquests by the sultan provided Zengi with a large, hereditary principality. Not only did Aleppo provide Zengi with material and financial support, it also elevated him to the highest levels of Islamic politics and afforded him the opportunity of using the battle cry of religion in his future expansionist policies.

A skillful strategist and diplomat, an excellent administrator, ruthless and competent, Zengi extended his sphere of influence so that at his death in 1146 it contained nearly all of Mesopotamia and a major segment of Syria. Twisting around the Mosul-Aleppo locus in surprise moves, Zengi's expansion efforts were aimed at Baghdad, Damascus, Edessa and the borders of the county of Tripoli. His manuevers aroused considerable enmity among his Islamic peers who, occasionally, allied with the crusaders for support. It was such an alliance that drew count Joscelin of Edessa away from his fortress capital in 1144 allowing Zengi's surprise attack and capture of Edessa. The victory was turned into a religious and personal one when Zengi destroyed all the resident Franks and their churches. As Islam's newest hero against the infidel, Zengi proceeded to attack Damascus and other Moslem allies of the crusaders. While so involved in 1146, Zengi was assassinated.

As was usually the case, Zengi's empire should have collapsed under the weight of internecine factionalism. His sons, Saif-ad-Dīn Ghazi and Nūr-ad-Dīn Mahmud, hastened to secure control of the lands for themselves - the former to Mosul and the latter to Aleppo. Only a fraternal agreement for cooperation preserved the Zengid rule at this moment, while Nūr-ad-Dīn's great abilities assured its future strength. Supported by the military loyalty of the Kurdish emir Shirkuh, by his marriage to the Damascene ruler's daughter and his intense religious piety to the Sunnite cause, Nūr-ad-Dīn developed an independent and powerful Moslem principality. He applied the vast revenues of the state not only toward strengthening his position in a world of enemies but also to the cultural, religious and educational areas so vital to the state he was attempting to create.

Nūr-ad-Dīn's first years were involved in expanding his control of the area east of the Orontes. Local Moslem rulers were brought into submission and the Antiochene count began to lose his easternmost holdings. Since the Second Crusade's leaders chose independent Damascus as their goal, the local ruler had little choice other than calling for Nūr-ad-Dīn's aid. The Frankish withdrawal here, coupled with Raymond of Antioch's defeat near Inab in 1149, virtually assured Nūr-ad-Dīn's control of the Syrian region. The outlying Edessan castles fell before his troops and the rule of Damascus was attained by force in 1154. Warfare with the Latins was now one of direct confrontation. The 1158 appearance in the area of the Byzantine armies under Manuel I posed a serious threat to Nūr-ad-Dīn's position. Recognizing that a Frankish-Byzantine alliance might block the Sunnite advance, Nūr-ad-Dīn swiftly yielded concessions to the Byzantine ruler. The latter, concerned chiefly with border security and recognizing Nūr-ad-Dīn as a weight against Latin haughtiness and over-reaching, was not inclined toward further advance and withdrew without effectuating joint action with Baldwin III's forces. By the beginning of 1169, Nūr-ad-Dīn had captured control of Moslem Syria and Fatimid Egypt. In the following year Mosul fell under his rule and he now controlled a vast Moslem territory united under his Sunnite banner. His death in 1174 left the Empire to his young son under the guardianship of ambitious generals. The expected dissolution of government control began and continued until Saladin gained the upper hand in the 1180's.

CHAPTER II

AMALRIC AS KING

1. Demographic, Social and Feudal Characteristics

As already noted, the crusaders were a distinct minority in the Levant. The feudal kingdom they had created rested upon a foundation of Moslem and eastern Christian townspeople and peasants. These subjects were allowed to live under a self-governing headman system. That the western Christian holdings in the Levant were not strongly secured has been discussed. While the north-south mileage exceeded 500 miles, the west-east depth rarely exceeded one-tenth of this. That the inland areas tended to remain under Moslem influence or control, further weakened the security of the kingdom. Contiguity with the enemy - Latin fortifications were rarely more than one or two day's distance from Moslem strongpoints - strongly influenced crusader attitudes and actions.

The western knights quickly learned to appreciate the military skill and zeal of their Islamic adversaries. Political and military ententes were made in order to maintain local rulers in their possessions. The necessity of, and desire for, hunting led to occasional joint expeditions. An interchange of ideas and customs occurred. The crusaders adopted the more comfortable dress of the east, the variety of foods and spices, the more advanced medical knowledge and the military tactics of combining infantry and cavalry in joint operations as well as the use of light cavalry. A further consequence of this interchange between enemies, in contrast to contemporary European anti-heretical, anti-schismatic, anti-Jewish and anti-pagan attitudes, was a growing atmosphere of mutual acceptance of the various forms of religious expression in the area. This striking Outremer development may also be explained by the catholicity of religious views, customs, methods of devotion and holy places.

There was an unspoken respect shared by Latins and Moslems for pilgrims and men of religion as well as for shrines and places of worship. Ibn Jubayr's pilgrimage chronicles the beneficial treatment accorded Moslems in the Frankish world,[1] as do the comments of Usamah ibn Munqidh.[2] Since native peasants handled agriculture, native craftsmen managed the arts and crafts industries and native merchants carried on local and international commerce, the crusaders may be said to have depended upon the local population for their daily needs. In contrast to European chroniclers' anti-infidel treatment of crusade history, William of Tyre's narrative reveals some understanding of the Moslem adversary and the world of Islam. As noted previously, the Levantine culture differed from the European in that the former was richer, brighter and much more varied. Eastern agriculture produced a broad variety of crops and fruits new to the crusaders' tastes, while the marketplaces abounded with locally made and imported products equally unfamiliar. Citruses, sugar cane, new plants, fabrics, furnishings, colors, dyes and scents were brought to Europe. Domestic furnishings, utensils and pottery added a degree of living comfort with which Europeans were unacquainted. Certainly, fashions in Europe were influenced by these new items. In general, concern for public and personal cleanliness and sanitation was reflected in public health measures regulating marketplaces, food and drug manufacture and hospitals.[3]

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[1] Broadhurst, The Travels of Ibn Jubayr, pp. 316 ff. Ibn Jubayr left Granada in February 1183 and returned from Mecca via Baghdad, Mosul, Aleppo and Damascus in 1184; he lived in Acre between October 8 - November 6, 1184 while awaiting a ship to Spain and returned home in May 1185.

[2] Philip K. Hitti, Usamah ibn Munqidh, An Arab-Syrian Gentleman and Warrior (Columbia, 1929). Usamah was lord of Shaizar (b. 1095-d. 1188), visited the Franks several times and commented extensively about his visits.

The Syrian region is naturally divided with a mountainous coast and an elongated valley area surrounded by the Lebanon and anti-Lebanon mountain ranges.[4] Proceeding south, these mountains decrease in number and size creating a larger coastal section on the one side and a narrow valley wending its way along the Jordan to the Dead Sea where it widens outward towards Elat on the other side. The Sinai desert to the south and the Syrian desert to the northeast surround Palestine. Syria follows the latter desert eastward to the Mesopotamian plain while its northern boundaries terminate at the Asia Minor plateau and the coast of Cilicia. The fertile coastal region had more extensive forest covering than at present: the Cilician and Galilean agricultural richness was of ancient fame although some hilly regions divided the cultivated areas; the north-south valley centered on the Orontes and Jordan rivers, the crossing of which focused on several difficult fording areas; vineyards, fields, and orchards yielding a variety of harvests including sugar and cotton dominated the coastal agriculture; the central valley's agricultural interests were more restricted to the cereal crops; vegetable, fruit and olive-tree cultivation marked the extent of urban gardening.

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[3] E. Wickersheimer, "Organisation et législation sanitaires au royaume franc de Jérusalem (1099-1291)" *Archives internationales d'Histoire des Sciences*, IV (1951).

[4] Jean Longnon, *Les Francais d'Outre-Mer au Moyen Age: Essai sur l'expansion francaise dans le bassin de la Mediterranée* (Perrin: Paris, 1929), pp. 126 ff.; Riley-Smith, *The Knights of St. John in Jerusalem and Cyprus (1050-1314)* (New York, 1969), pp. 18-29; J. Prawer, "The Settlement of the Latins in Jerusalem," *Speculum*, XXVII (1952), 499-502; E. Rey, *Les Colonies franques de Syrie aux XIIme et XIIIme siècles* (Paris, 1883), pp. 118 ff.; Adolf Waas, *Geschichte der Kreuzzüge* (Freiburg, 1956), II, 196-210 also noting crusader patterns of living.

The Syrian buffer regions of Antioch and Edessa served to protect the supply and reinforcement routes. Similarly concerned with security, the Outre-Jordain lordship controlling the Dead Sea-Elat pilgrimage and caravan routes guaranteed Jordan valley safety. The eastern boundaries were most insecure owing to Moslem control of the major Meccan pilgrimage route cities of Aleppo, Hamah, Homs and Damascus. The Egyptian coastal approach routes were controlled after the

1152 Frankish capture of Ascalon while the interior approach was dominated by the lordship of Saint-Abraham (Hebron) controlling much of Judea. The well-protected coastal territories contained several fiefs: the county of Ascalon-Jaffa; the lordship of Arsus (Apollonie); the county of Caesarea and the lordship of Haifa (Cayfas or Caiffa); the royal cities of Acre and Tyre (Sur), the barony of Sidon (Saïette), the lordship of Beirut (Beyrouth or Barut) and the county of Tripoli connecting the kingdom with Antioch. Sidon, Beirut and Tripoli were the Latin coastal opposites of Damascus, Homs, and Hamah lying beyond the Lebanon mountains. Many of the ancient and once famous coastal cities were restored to prominence by the crusaders: Antioch, Laodicea, Tortosa, Gibelet, Beirut, Sidon, Tyre, Acre, Caesarea, Jaffa and Ascalon.

The easternmost borders of the kingdom, from north to south, ran from the Lebanon mountains through the Litany valley, alongside the Jordan, to the east of the Dead Sea and down to the Gulf of Aqabah at the port city of Elat. The west bordered the Mediterranean from al-Dārum, south of Gaza, to Nahr al-Kalb, north of Beirut.

The smaller county of Tripoli fronted the Mediterranean from Nahr al-Kalb to northern Tortosa (Tartūs), bordered the Assassin-Shaizar-Hamah territories south to Montferrand (Ba'rīn), paralleled the Orontes west bank near Homs (Chamele) on the southeast through the Lebanons past Gibelet (Jubail) where it turned westward to the sea.

The Antiochene principality fronted the Mediterranean from southern al-Marqab past the Gulf of Alexandria to the Cilician coast near Tarsus, turned inland heading eastward north of Marash and south of Aleppo, paralleled the Orontes east bank to Kafartāb and then coastward north of Shaizar. The Edessan fall in 1144 and subsequent capture of Joscelin II in 1150 was followed by an Antiochene absorption of the westernmost Edessan areas.

The county of Edessa straddled an area northeast of Antioch and across the Euphrates - from Marash to northern Besni and Samsat - southward between Edessa and Harran and then westward between Tilbeshar and Aleppo.

The interior territory in the north and the Jordan valley were defended by the principality of Galillee while the capital city of Jerusalem was protected by the lordships of Caimont, Bessān, Naplouse (Neapolis) and Saint-Georges. Neither Naplouse nor Jerusalem achieved any prominent degree of commercial activity since interior commerce was largely centered at Damascus and Aleppo. The Moslem trading cities of Homs, Hamah and Shaizar were not conquered by the Franks, while Apamea (Afāmiyah) and Edessa were only temporarily in Latin hands.

In a land so preoccupied with military interests, the castle became the focus for defense. All were engineered so that their favorable defensive positions dominated their areas and the routes which passed nearby. The forts of the Outre-Jordain controlled the ravine attack routes into the

Jordan area; Banyas dominated the Damascus-upper Jordan valley caravan routes; Crac des Chevaliers towered over the narrow gorge controlling the Hamah-Tripoli road; Templar and Hospitaller castles in Antioch and Tripoli ringed the Assassin-dominated mountain region. Crusader castles, cities and ports were interconnected by two main roads - the coastal road of the conquest now used for supplies and the Acre-Naplouse-Jerusalem road - and a network of less travelled roads. Moslem caravan routes for Egypt-Damascus trade followed the Gaza-Galillee or the Outre-Jordain roads; for the Acre-Damascus trade they used the Tiberias-Banyas (Paneas) road and for the Meccan pilgrimage they passed the Outre-Jordain castles of Kerak and Montreal (ash-Shaubak). Nearly all of the Latin and Moslem roads were under the protection of various nobles for whose services fees were charged.[5]

The Mediterranean sea route was the communications link to Europe. The combined Latin-Italian-Byzantine fleet served to defend the Holy Land coast, assisted in the several Egyptian campaigns and transported supplies and reinforcements.[6]

Colonization activities marked the twelfth century with royal, religious and baronial emphasis being given to immigration and the creation of new communities.[7] By 1187,

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5. Rey, Colonies franques. . . , p. 252.

6. Ibid., p. 162 notes that travelling time between Marseilles and Acre was 15-20 days.

7. J. Prawer, "Colonisation Activities in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem," Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire, XXIX (1951), 1063-1118.

estimates place 120,000-150,000 Frankish bourgeoisie in the Holy Land.[8] The kingdom's commercial activities were centered in the coastal cities and dominated by the Italian and Provençal communes.[9] Much of Europe's sugar came from Outremer although the Moslem trading cities of Aleppo, Mosul and Damascus were the key economic areas in the east. Holy Land commerce required a degree of middle east peace which would, more significantly, unite Islam and thereby bring disaster to the Franks.

The basic agricultural pattern was that of central villages controlling communally worked land. The fief-holder had the basic monopolies and requisition rights, a terrage rent proportionally fixed on harvest and animals, a thrice annual tax known as the presentica, nutrimenta or monet and the taille.[10] The lord's demesne was limited to vineyards, olive groves, sugar-cane fields and gardens.[11] This absence of workable demesne lands tended to develop town-dwelling absentee owners who allowed self-rule under a Latin dragoman or native rais responsible for community stability.

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[8] Riley-Smith, op. cit., p. 19. These numbers certainly offer an area for further study as does their implication regarding the extensive activities such a bourgeois class would undertake.

[9] Claude Cahen, "Notes sur l'histoire des croisades et de l'Orient latin. 3. L'Orient latin et commerce du Levant, Bulletin de la Faculté des lettres de Strasbourg, XXIX (1950/1); Waas, Geschichte . . ., notes trade in pepper, ginger, nutmeg, rice, licorice, indigo, silk goods and camel's hair material.

[10] Ibid., "2. Le régime rurale Syrien au temps de la domination franque," p. 301 notes imposition of tithe only for Latins.

[11] J. Prawer, "Seigneurie croisée . . . ," XXIII (1953), 145.

Latin church jurisdiction was shared by the Jerusalem and Antioch patriarchs, followed a program of cooperation with non-Latin Christians and fell under royal and noble influence.[12] The crusader monarchs held patriarchal and episcopal election presentation rights as well as regalian rights during episcopal vacancies. As feudal lords, church figures held baronial judicial rights while owing military service for their lands.

In their relations with the kings of Jerusalem, the rulers of the several appendage states acted as did the great feudatories of France with their kings - they followed a policy of studied independence of actions.[13] This was complicated by the occasional and temporary recognition of some external suzerainty: Byzantine and Antiochene with the county of Tripoli and Byzantine with the principality of Antioch.

Tripolitan counts were hereditary by the mid-twelfth century, held regalian powers, had major governmental officers serving them, levied a reasonably strong army as well as maintaining a sizable fleet, presided over a court of high justice while allowing courts for the bourgeoisie of their county. The geographically weakly-defended county saw its early southern French colonization slow down by the mid-twelfth century. Subsequent military needs brought about an enlarged role for the Hospitallers and the Templars.[14]

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[12] W. Hotzelt, Kirchengeschichte Palästinas im Zeitalter der Kreuzzüge, 1099-1291; Richard, Le royaume latin . . . , pp. 92-103; F. Chandon de Briailles, "Le Droit de 'coins' dans le royaume de Jérusalem," Syria, XXIII (1942/3).

[13] Longnon, Les Français d'Outre-Mer au Moyen-Age . . . , p. 107 notes older view that Jerusalem dominated others by 'l'autorité morale de son titre royal et du prestige de la Ville Sainte.'

Antiochene virtual autonomy from royal control dominated the Antioch-Jerusalem relationship although nominal Byzantine suzerainty was occasionally recognized. The strong, wealthy and hereditary princes used a Byzantine-styled bureaucratic government to enforce their powers, although courts of high and merchant justice existed. Military needs after the 1164 defeat at Artāh similarly brought on enlarged Hospitaller and Templar involvement along the principality's borders.

Jewish communities at Ramleh and Jaffa, which predate the crusades, lost their importance after the Franks centered their economic activities at Acre and Tyre.[15] The community at Jerusalem, crushed in the 1099 purge of the city, was never fully reconstituted. Although the crusader monarchs allowed several Jewish groups to settle in Jerusalem, reconstitution of the community did not occur until after Saladin's capture of the city. Hebron had no Jewish community during the period under study while the Haifa Jews, who had lived there under the Egyptian caliph's protection, were massacred during the Frankish conquest of the city. The Ascalon community was not destroyed during the 1153 capture and continued to flourish until Saladan razed the city in 1191. Tyre was the spiritual center for twelfth century Outremer jewry with the Jewish inhabitants living in the Venetian quarter near the town's entrance, in the royal quarter and in the Genoese quarter.

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[14] J. Richard, Le Comté de Tripoli sous la dynastie toulousaine (1102-1187); M. W. Baldwin, Raymond III of Tripolis and the Fall of Jerusalem (Princeton, 1936).

[15] J. Prawer, "The Jews in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem," Tsion, II (September 45 - July 46).

The community of Acre was restored during the second half of the twelfth century and there were smaller settlements at Tiberias and Safed. Among the dozen rural settlements were those in the coastal towns of Beirut, Sidon and Caesaria and in the southern towns of Lydda, Bethlehem, Beit Naubia, Gerin and Beit Jibrin. Generally, Jewish communities in towns captured by the crusaders during the first decades of the twelfth century were destroyed. Communities in towns captured after this period were largely unscathed, reflecting a change in crusader treatment of the native population. The Jews were subject to the jurisdiction of the various local authorities in their areas of residence and, therefore, the Fonde. The Jewish communities were especially engaged in the handicrafts and decorative painting industries, glass manufacturing, medicine and ship owning. Intercity trade within the kingdom was conducted on a minor scale equivalent to peddling. Little involvement in international trade has been noted for the period under study although moneylending was conducted in cooperation with Christian bankers. In contrast to the European treatment of Jews as regalian property outside the contemporary social structure, the Jewish communities in the Holy Land fared relatively well economically, socially and judicially.

Northern Syria was a weak link in the crusaders' border defenses and this fact necessitated an increase in influence wielded by Manuel I Comnenus, the Byzantine Emperor.[16] The motivation behind Manuel's desire to assist his Latin neighbors is easily understood: he looked for a reunion of the Byzantine and western churches; he planned to renew Byzantine power by expanding to the east, the west and the south; he wanted domination over Antioch as evidenced by his marriage to Bohemond of Antioch's sister, Mary, and Bohemond's marriage to Manuel's niece, Theodora; he understood the value to be derived from the capture or neutralization of Fatimid Egypt - the economic enrichment of his empire through control of the vast Egyptian trade with the east and the military strength of attacking his Islamic foes from two strong bases. Manuel's diplomatic activities demonstrate a fluidity of action. His desire to prevent a Moslem encirclement of Outremer may have been part of his plan to keep western interest in the east focused away from his empire.[17]

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[16] The sources for this period are: John Cinnamus, *Epitome Historiarum* in (*RHC*, *Grecs*, 1) and (*Patrologiae graecie cursus completus . . .* , ed. Migne, Paris, 1857) and (*Corpus Scriptorum historiae byzantinae*, ed. I. Bekker, Bonn, 1836); *Nicetas Choniates, Historia Manuelo Comneno* in (*CSHB*, Bonn, 1835, I); Anna Comnena, *Alexiad*, ed. B. Lieb (Paris, 1937-1945) and ed. E. Dawes (London, 1928); G. Ostrogorsky, *Pour l'histoire de la féodalitie byzantine* and ------, *Quelques problèmes d'histoire de la paysannerie byzantine* (Brussels, 1956) discuss administrative and economic developments; P. Lamma, *Comneni e Staufer: richerche sui rapporti fra Bisanzio e l'occidente nel secolo XII* (Studi Storici fasc. 14-18 and 22-25, Rome, 1955-1957) noting diplomatic relations of period 1143-1185, citing Manuel's deliberate introduction of Latin elements in order to invigorate his empire, and discerning Manuel's diplomatic fluidity; A. A. Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine Empire: 324-1453* (Madison, Wisconsin, 1952) notes intensity of Manuel's involvement with the west as evidenced by the unending array of royal visitors to his court as well as by his two marriages to western princesses - Bertha of Sulzbach (Irene) was the sister-in-law of the Holy Roman Emperor, Conrad III and Mary of Antioch (Maria), sister of Bohemond of Antioch; Joan M. Hussey, "Byzantium and the Crusades, 1081-1204," *History of the Crusades*, II (1962), 123-152.

Manuel's successful befriending of Bohemond of Antioch found the latter extremely grateful for Byzantine assistance. Manuel's relationship with Amalric was of even greater importance. Searching for a new wife, Amalric decided upon a Byzantine union and received Manuel's grand-niece, Maria Commena, for his bride in August, 1167. As will be discussed later, the resulting Franco-Byzantine campaign was of noble proportions. Their goal of conquest, however, was denied because of the Frankish baronial greed in wanting the wealth for themselves rather than shared with the Greeks and the intemperate urging for attack by the Hospitallers under Gilbert d'Assailly. The sum of Manuel's crusader policy may be termed one of image-inflating victories lacking any definite or lasting advantage for either Byzantium or Outremer.

2. Royal Position

a. Constitutional Development, Laws and Institutions

The first crusaders, largely members of the Bouillon family or vassals in their service,[18] found Holy Land employment as royal or princely vassals. As a result of the small royal demesne, the constant state of combat and the uneven rate and nature of immigration, these knights exercised a reduced freedom of action and probably held money-fiefs rather than land tenure. The infeudation process begun during Balwin I's reign structured the kingdom's political organization along feudal lines. Although feudal jurisdictional independence increased during the early military phases of the kingdom's establishment, the royal power to intercede in the exercise of this feudal justice was retained. Since the noble families and their possessions suffered greatly from constant warfare, the earliest legislation was designed to develop an orderly control, inheritance and infeudation process for the feudal territories.[19] By thus

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[17] Hussey, "Byzantium . . . ," pp. 135-140.

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18. J. Andressohn, The Ancestry and Life of Godfrey of Bouillon (1947) and J. Prawer, "La Noblesse et régime féodal du royaume latin de Jerusalem," Le Moyen Age, LXV (Brussels, 1959), 42 note that the Syrian-Palestinian surnames of these immigrants reflects on their modest European family origins.

19. M. Grandclaude, "Liste d'assises romontant au premier royaume de Jérusalem," Melanges Paul Fournier (1929), pp. 329 ff. includes these in the early assizes, as well as legislation concerning female succession. The view that juridical treaties furnish a base for examination of Outremer institutions is to be found in: G. Dodu, Histoire des Institutions monarchiques du Royaume latin de Jérusalem (1894) which first assembled these institutions; J. L. La Monte, Feudal Monarchy in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem (1932) which defines periods and institutions involved; J. Richard, Le Royaume latin de Jérusalem (1953) and J. Prawer examine specifics to show institutional patterns; Claude Cahen, La Syrie du Nord à l'époque des Croisades et la Principauté franque d'Antioche (1940) notes need to view institutions, particularly Antiochene, as separate developments rather

assuring the feudal position, these statutes held the nobles more closely to the kingdom; female succession assured the knight who had fought hard for his fief that it would remain in his family; infeudation rules extended the privilege of possessing a fief to all members of the knight's family; possessory control broadened the warrior-knight base by requiring all family members to hold territory before a knight could possess more property and strengthened the noble's feudal economic power by restricting sub-infeudation which would reduce the lord's financial reward. Strong royal power was based upon military leadership and authority, royal possessions and wealth, wardship over minors and widows, escheatment and dispossession of vassals.[20] Cohesive feudal

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than part of a Jerusalemite institutional corpus for the area; H. E. Mayer, "Probleme moderner Kreuzzugsforschung," *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftgeschichte*, L (1964), 505-513; J. A. Brundage, "Recent Crusade Historiography - Some Observations and Suggestions," *Catholic Historical Review*, XLIX (1964), 493-507.

[20] J. Prawer, "Les Premiers temps de la féodalité dans le royaume latin de Jérusalem," *Revue de l'histoire du Droit*, XXII (1954), 401-424; ------, "Etude sur le Droit des *Assises de Jérusalem*: Droit de Confiscation et Droit d'Exheredation," *RHD*, XXXIX (1961), 510-581 and XL (1962), 29-42; Richard, *Le Royaume latin . . .*, pp. 72 ff. describes the royal desmesne; Claude Cahen, "La féodalité et les institutions politiques de l'Orient latin," *Convegno di Scienze Morali Storiche e Filologiche: Oriente ed Occidente nel medio evo* (Academia Nazionale dei Lincei, Fondazione Alessandro Volta, Instituita dalla societa Edison di Milano, Atti dei Convegni, 12, 1957), pp. 167-197 shows the juxtaposition and/or synthesis occurring institutionally in Outremer after conquest and examines the problems of influence, coexistence and mutal ignorance between the institutions of the two societies brought together.

opposition to this royal authority failed to develop owing to the abovementioned feudal instability and abbreviated family longevity.

The crusader political structure was strongly affected by constant exterior and interior war or the threat of war.[21] The major political influence of the nobility, as compared with the clerical faction, may be explained by the war conditions and the concern with effective military action. The *Assise de Teneure* may have been designed to maintain the kingdom's defenses.[22] Certainly, the post-1187 war disasters reduced the royal desmesne and, thereby, the institutional power of the monarchy. The more extensive use of money-fiefs based on local commerce and urban revenues following these military losses may be viewed as the crown's attempt at replacing lost vassals. The war status influenced the development of the military orders, already politically influential as a result of crusade ideology's santification of warfare by ecclesiasts.

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[21] The subject of the 12th century crusader political system is discussed in: J. Prawer, "The *Assise de Teneure . . .*"; ------, "Les Premiers temps de la féodalité . . ."; ------, "La Noblesse et le régime féodal . . ."; ------, "Etude sur le Droit . . ."; ------, "Estates, Communities and the Constitution of the Latin Kingdom," *Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities*, II no. 6 (Jerusalem, 1966), 1-27, 39-42 trans. F. L. Cheyette in *Lordship and Community in Medieval Europe* (New York, 1968), pp. 376-403; J. Richard, "Pairie d'Orient latin; Les Quatre Baronies des Royaumes de Jérusalem et Chypre," *RHDFE*, XXVIII (1950), 67-89; R. B. Patterson, "The Early Existence of the *Funda* and *Catena* in the XXIIth Century Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem," *Speculum*, XXXIX (1964), 474-477; Richard, *Le Royaume latin . . .* indicates new approach to crusader politics and H. E. Mayer, *Geschichte der Kreuzzüge* (Stuttgart, 1965) incorporates main conclusions of newer studies.

[22] Grandclaude, *ibid* and Prawer, "The *Assise de Teneure . . .*," also recognize that assize codification and redaction did not occur prior to 1200, a significant lapse from the time of the loss of the original law codes - *Lettres du Sepulchre* - during the 1187 fall of Jerusalem; J. L. La Monte, "Three Questions concerning the Assises of Jerusalem," *Byzantina-Metabyzantina*, I (1946), 203 studies the *Lettres du Sepulchre* and their possible applications as law codes.

Two corporate groupings active in crusader society in this period were the military orders and the Italian/ Provençal communes. Urban corporations and the bourgeoisie, however, failed to develop concurrently. The diffuse composition of a crusader kingdom in constant flux stands out against the homogeneity and structured activities of the orders and the communes. These two groupings held key roles in the economic, political and military developments of Outremer. The noble military orders drew great strength from their international holdings, their military zeal and their political alliances with baronial or royal factions. Their supra-legality to church and royal jurisdiction assured for them an independence of action which, on occasion, endangered royal programs even though the orders' goal was the defense of Outremer. The communal corporations' membership allegiance and supra-legality, contractually established during the first phases of crusader conquest, provided as much political influence as their trading activities influenced the economic health of Outremer. However, the urban climate of the Latin Kingdom did not produce the corporate structure contemporaneously developing in Europe, despite the extensive degree of Christian urbanization in

Outremer.[23] While Latin-controlled cities were large, wealthy and densely populated, city organization may have been restricted by constant warfare causing the Franks to center themselves within these fortified centers. By so doing, the nobles removed the option for urban autonomy from the bourgeoisie.[24] No royal urban policy may be said to have existed, nor were there city charters or privileges.[25] The development of the Cour des Bourgeois under the viscount's direction with merchant-jurors would appear to be the major recognition of any special standing for the urban bourgeoisie. Further, that no monopolistic guild organization existed was perhaps caused by the unwillingness of artisans from different religious backgrounds to work together, or by the need created by the immigrational nature of Frankish colonial expansion for a climate of non-exclusive business activities which would welcome the Latin bourgeoisie.[26]

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[23] Prawer, "Colonisation Activities . . . ," 1062-1118 noting Frankish Christian urban settlement, except for major Latin castles (i.e., Crac des Chevaliers and Safad) and some key villages, while general colonization efforts were largely unsuccessful; -----, "The Settlement of the Latins. . . ," 490-503.

[24] Prawer. "Estates, Communities. . . ," pp. 384-385 presents the case for this view and the lack of guild organization discussed below.

[25] Prawer, "The Settlement of the Latins. . ." notes Jerusalemite privileges of lowered food taxes and absentee landlords' defaulting property and possession rights; however, these privileges were granted to all inhabitants as an attempt at securing the support of the population; WT, XXII, 23 notes that responsibility for collecting 1182 general levy was not given to the Cour des Bourgeois but to four prominent citizens in each town, further emphasizing the lack of corporate recognition.

The European world contemporary with the early crusaders underwent an urban emancipation in which the bourgeoisie received a special legal position in society. As noted, this position was not to be found in Outremer.[27] In contrast, Byzantine and Moslem bourgeoisie enjoyed no special distinction within their centralized, bureaucratic worlds although the degree of their commerce and industry left its merchant imprint upon the area's economy. The influence of this merchant background upon crusader developments has been noted: fortresses guarded commercial routes; the land was cultivated by the liberally treated native population and the towns provided a ready-made citizenry and commercial life. A dual court development - Cour des Bourgeois and Cour des Barons, in which the non-noble Franks used the former to achieve an independence of action from the feudal lords, further promoted a favorable business climate for the bourgeoisie.[28] This duality reflects on the previously noted Mediterranean pattern of allowing, within the limits of customary royal and seignorial rights, native communities to

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26. Livre des Assises des Bourgeois c. 298 (H. Cr., Lois, II, 169) notes exception in the field of medicine where the examination and licensing of doctors by religious and medical officials was required.

27. J. Prawer, "Etude préliminaire sur les sources et la composition des Assises des Bourgeois," RHDFE (1954) reviews the bourgeoisie position in the kingdom's history.

28. Cahen, Syrie du Nord . . . , p. 547; Richard, Le Royaume latin . . . , p. 113.

exercise their local laws.[29] This autonomy was a reflection of the economic needs of these merchant communities. The Italian/Provençal commercial cities received similar grants in Outremer as a result of the crusaders' need for their commercial activities and their transference of funds for crusade support collected in Europe.

The characteristics distinguishing feudal and bourgeois Franks in Outremer result from their adopting previous traditions to a world of conquest and constant war.[30] The native Syrian population had been conditioned to Seljuk proprietary-military fiscal control emphasizing their personal dependence upon the prince.[31] Frankish feudalism hardly changed the situation since native communal work patterns and collective responsibility to a local lord were strongly-rooted, ancient traditions. The pre-crusade Syrian fiscal system, shattered by governmental upheavals, showed little evidence of an earlier centralized bureaucracy.[32] Frankish failure to capture the key economic centers of Damascus and Aleppo forced them to create their own fiscal system although

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29. Depourneaux, Les Français en Espagne aux XIe-XIIe siècles and R. S. Lopez, "Du marché temporaire à la colonie permanente," Annales ESC (1949) study activities and legal rights of Frankish colonies in Spain and the many small Jewish colonies scattered throughout the Mediterranean area.

30. Cahen, "La féodalité et les institutions politiques . . . ," pp. 177-180 noting that adapting from European patterns was more the case than imitating eastern tradions.

31. Cahen, "Le régime rural syrien au temps de la domination franque," Bulletin de la Faculté des lettres de Strasbourg, XXIX (1951).

32. Cahen, "La féodalité . . . , pp. 183-184.

some earlier records were preserved in Jerusalem and Antioch. This new fiscal amalgam - the Secrète - differed from its Moslem predecessor in that: the former maintained lists of fiefs and services owed while the latter left this to a separate military administrator; former Moslem proprietary colonizers now became part of the Latin royal treasury holdings reflecting the shift of public taxation into the feudal pattern of government; the Moslem corvée restricted to works of communal utility and absence of census taxes differed from Latin precedents but the western rural system was not imposed on the Syrian natives; under the Franks, Moslem natives were required to pay a household tax.

Justice between Frank and non-Frank was to be found in the baronial court or the Cour des Bourgeois while commercial cases would be handled in the courts of the Fonde (Bazar or Funda) and the Chaîne (Catena or de Mer).[33] The Fonde was organized in villages having any notable commercial activity, was composed of four Syrians and two Franks under the viscount's presidency and used local laws of commerce whenever applicable. The Chaîne dealt with maritime matters using the general Mediterranean rules of commerce and was composed only of Franks. The viscount was charged with responsibility for securing and maintaining public order. Serving the private affairs of the crusader society, the law and overseeing the judicial process was largely entrusted to ecclesiastical authorities.

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[33] Cahen, ibid., and R. B. Patterson, "The Early Existence of the Funda . . . ."

Two native officials regularly appear as part of the administrative-judicial processes - the *raïs* (*ra'îs*, *reïs* or *regulus*) and the mathessep (muhtasib). The *raïs* was the urban militia chief responsible for local security and the municipal government representative responsible to the local lord.[34] He was the representative of his social grouping to the Franks and, as such, exercised civil and a lower grade of criminal justice within his area. The position, one of the earliest organizational posts utilizing the traditional native structure of the area, declined before the rise of the *Fonde* which handled similar areas of justice. The *mathessep* is an unclear position. Its Moslem predecessor was responsible for preserving public morality and religion and for controlling local commerce. These tasks required the use of some non-police armed forces under the *mathessep's* direction. Since the Franks assigned the responsibility for public order and trade-control to the viscount, the *mathessep* was replaced.[35]

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[34] Cahen, "Movements et organisations populaires dan les villes de l'Asie musulmane au Moyen-Age," *Recueil de la Société Jean Bodin*, VII no. 2 (1955) notes that *raïs*' significance remained only in those areas where commerce was slight since no *Fonde* would be established in these areas; D. Hayek, *Le droit franc en Syrie pendant les Croisades* (1925), p. 132 examines *raïs* development; J. Richard in Cahen, "Le régime rural . . . ," p. 194 notes that several Latin nobles also held the position and/or title of *raïs*.

[35] Tafel and Thomas, *Urkunden zur älteren Handelsgeschichte der Republik Venedig*, II, no. 299, p. 354 when referring to Venetian possessions in Tyre in 1243 notes the only reference to the position by terming it as a no longer existing ancient position.

Of further consideration is the need to view the crusaders' basic preservation of the native patterns and laws against the background of the general European respect for local customs. The medieval mentality was not geared to admit the opportunity to change tradition, therefore one should see the Frankish maintenance of native justice and officials as basic to their European background.

As noted, Syrian village organization was affected by the Frankish conquest in that the lord collected local taxes and controlled the region through the use of the native *raïs* official while the lord lived in the cities. Since the Latin governmental hierarchy viewed the *raïs* as a lower-level official necessary as the representative of the Syrian natives, it would appear correct to state that the *raïs* continued to function only in those areas where commerce was inconsequential. It is hardly likely that the crusaders would grant local representation and/or governance to any area of significant economic value to them. The Latin conquest, therefore, did not significantly modify the Syrian village's economic structure. In particular, the imposition of the European form of seignorially reserved lands for corvée exploitation was rare.[36]

A weakening of royal power is the major constitutional change occurring during the reign of Fulk (1131-1143) and Baldwin III (1143-1163). Baronial revolts in the

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[36] Cahen, "Le régime rural . . . ."

1130s,[37] as well as civil war in the 1150s over the disputed royal succession between Melisende and Baldwin, show the changing position of royal authority. The period of 1131-1163 witnesses a strengthened and stabilized noble power: succession was regularized, escheats were rare, new feudal lords were created and noble immigration increased. Noble class separatism within the crusade society may be identified in this period:[38] debt imprisonment curtailed after 1146;[39] guarantee of nobles' right to remain mounted during siege provided by the 1168 Assize of Bilbeis. A small number of powerful families developed within the noble grouping, concentrating land wealth by circumventing early legislation restricting fief accumulation. Since these multi-fief possessors were now allowed to hire soldiers to perform military service, the early law's intended purpose of intensifying noble colonization of the kingdom was now altered. The multi-fief great families absorbed knights into crusader feudalism via the process of the aforementioned money-fiefs.[40]

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37. Count Hugh le Puiset of Jaffa and Romain le Puy of Outre-Jordain led those rebelling against Fulk.

38. Prawer, "La Noblesse et le régime féodal . . . ," pp. 48--50; Cahen, ibid., p. 173; Prawer, "Estates, Communities . . . ," p. 376; notes 'enfeeblement of royal prerogatives and a corresponding rise in power of noble families.'

39. Jean d'Ibelin c. 188 (H. Cr., Lois, I, 300-301); Prawer, ibid ascribes this to latter period of Baldwin III's reign or the early part of Amalric I's reign.

40. Cahen, ibid., p. 172 holds view that lesser knights allowed great lords extensive leeway in running things because of military needs.

During this same period, the nobles gained the right of family consent and, eventually, refusal over the royal nominees as new husbands for noble widows. Concerned with social ranking and wealth, the families were reserved refusal on the grounds of disparagement and misalliance, thereby weakening the royal opportunity of rewarding loyal followers. These restrictions served to stratify the nobles and set the minority of power and wealth far apart from the less wealthy and hardly influential lower nobility - the milites or chevaliers. The multi-fief possessors - the tenants-in-chief, magnates, nobiles, riches homes or barons - zealously guarded their power from encroachment by new Latin noble immigrants as well as by the king.[41]

The lesser nobles' services to the crown are partially examined in a royal list of 1170 which reveals that 40 per cent of the knights were royal vassals while the remaining 60 per cent attached to the seignorial domains were royal rear-vassals.[42]

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[41] Prawer, ibid., pp. 51-52 notes xenophobic link in opposition to Queen Melisende's constable Manasses of Hierges, to the unsuccessful Count Thierry of Flanders, to Renaud de Châtillon, Miles de Plancy and the several Lusignans.

[42] Jean d'Ibelin c. 271 (H. Cr., Lois, I, 422-426); J. Richard, "Les listes de fiefs dans Jean d'Ibelin," RHD, 4me sér., XXXII (1954), 566 ff. examines the dating of this list; Prawer, ibid., pp. 52-53 catalogs 257 royal knights 402 knights tied to the lay seignories and 16 knights on ecclesiastical seignories. Subtracting the Haifa, Scandalion and Blanchegarde contingents (totalling 21) since they were no longer part of the royal demesne as well as the Beyrouth contingent (23) which was merely totalled, Prawer's detailed analysis of the remaining 213 royal knights being counted shows:

The detailed list of royal vassals shows them to be heterogeneous in composition, with the key feudal element being fiefs of one knight's service and those with one or two vassals. The Chamberlain's fief with six knights, the Constable's with seven and those of the Viscount of Naplouse and Balian of Ibelin at Naplouse with fourteen knights each are the exceptions. The two dozen major holdings were possessed by ten lords representing less than ten families. No middle grouping of knights existed between the upper grouping and the rest of the nobility, thereby preventing any challenge to the power of the great lords. There was rarely more than one degree of vassalage. The royal demesne at Jerusalem had twenty vassals and twenty-one rear-vassals, St.-Jean d'Acre had twenty-three vassals and nine rear-vassals excluding the fiefs of the kingdom's officers, Tyre had fourteen vassals and fourteen rear-vassals and Naplouse had thirty-five vassals and the same number of rear-vassals excluding the Ibelin holdings. The seignorial sub-infeudation did not even approximate the limited degree noted above for the royal possessions.

Fiefs en besant - money-fiefs on royal revenues, markets, customs or maritime ports - were held by many knights,

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59 owing only their own service
16 owing their own and 1 additional vassal's service
8 owing their own and 2 additional vassals' services
6 owing their own and 3 additional vassals' services
2 owing their own and 4 additional vassals' services
2 owing their own and 6 additional vassals' services
1 owing his own and 7 additional vassals' services.

particularly being common to the coastal territories.[43] Since the money-fiefs were conditioned on an active economic life, the port cities offered the greatest opportunity for their use. However, the interior commercial cities of Tiberias in Galilee and Naplouse in Samaria also provided the necessary economic conditions. The number of money-fiefs may explain the size of the Latin force at the battle of Hattin in 1187 since the land-fief system alone could not support an army of 675 knights.[44] Since the income value of the money-fiefs averaged 400-500 besants,[45] slightly above the 350 besants minimum cost of living, it would indicate that the income/expense margin was most minimal. This would further substantiate the abovementioned noble social stratification as the money-fief knights, out of necessity, occupied a weak social and economic position. Barring unusual expenditures, their limited incomes hardly allowed them to enjoy the aristocratic style of life traditional to their peer group. The lesser nobility remained socially superior to the natives and the Italian/Provençal/Frankish bourgeoisie in the Holy Land. They could not exercise the noble right to command since they were directly dependent upon their lords, thereby further limiting their political influence. The money-fief had a mercenary character about it which further weakened the position of the lower nobility, now totally dependent upon their lords. An anti-monarchical trend resulted in which the town-dwelling nobility, with their diminishing rural possessions, developed a class solidarity dependent upon the great lords.[46] This urbanization further weakened the royal position. That money-fiefs were in wide usage in the east may have influenced the crusader development.[47]

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[43] J. Prawer, "Etudes de quelques problèmes agraires et sociaux d'une seignorie croisée au XIIIe siècle," Byzantion, XXII (1952), 19, 23 examining seignories of Tyre and Arsuf.

[44] C. R. Smail, Crusading Warfare (1956), p. 89 notes the fielding of 675 crusader knights against Saladin; Prawer, "La Noblesse et le régime féodal . . . ," pp. 53-54; F. Lot, L'art militaire et les armées au moyen-âge, I (1946), 219 and E. Andouin, Essai sur l'armée royale au temps de Philippe Auguste (1913), p. 3 compare Hattin figures with approximately 800 French knights in 1216 and 700 French knights at the battle of Bouvines.

[45] La Monte, Feudal Monarchy . . . , p. 150 places income level value at 600-1000 besants; Prawer, ibid., and n. 51-53, supports lower value by allowing for lord's profit, citing direct investiture cost of 400-500 besants (Philip of Novara c. 67), noting Lusignan colonization of Cyprus evidence of 400-500 besants value and 13th century daily knight's wages of 7s. 6d. equivalent to one Latin gold besant.

Under Amalric I, feudal rules were adjusted before the social and economic realities abovementioned, producing changed infeudation procedures and the issuance of the Assise sur le ligece. The first crusaders had possessed their fiefs through their direct and collateral lines but the 1150s-1160s witnessed possessory restriction to direct descendants through legal wives.[48] This change yielded little benefit to the crown since a one knight fief escheat diminished the kingdom's defensive posture and, therefore, required the king to rapidly replace the lost knight. Further, escheatment of a major noble possession was rare since the great families held lands under the early broad investment formula including their many relatives. The change, therefore, probably served the interests of the great lords since their benefit from the escheat of one of their vassals would be relatively significant.

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[46] Cahen, ibid., p. 174.

[47] G. Ostrogorsky, Pour l'histoire de la féodalité byzantine (1954), pp. 12-14 defines similar Byzantine forms of military service; Cahen, "L'évolution de l'iqtâ," Annales (1953), pp. 34, 39, 46 discusses value estimates for Moslem iqtâ - fiscal rights to land without proprietary ownership although some administrative control may be given, notes iqtâ change in the 12th century to hereditary possession and suggests that this may be an imitation of then current Frankish patterns (p. 44).

Amalric may have relinquished a key regalian right concerning shipwreck,[49] further illustrating the growing political influence of the great lords. Royal control over port and maritime activities had, since the onset of Outremer, been a symbol of and source for royal power. After the 1130s, royal control over the ports yielded to baronial powers as the coastal region was extensively infeudated. Amalric's shipwreck grants appear to recognize the limitation on royal intervention developed by the extension of baronial authority.

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[48] R. Röhricht, Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani,1097-1291 (Innsbruck, 1893), docs. 465 (1169) and 517 (1174) of Almaric limited succession to legitimately procreated heirs.

[49] Livre des assises de la cour des bourgeois c. 49 (H. Cr., Lois, II, 47): 'whenever a ship may wreck, the lord of the land must have the mainsail and tiller of a ship broken up on the sea or on land, for King Amalric gives this liberty to all the Kingdom of Jerusalem.'

2. b. Amalric's Role as king and the Issuance of the *Assise sur la Ligece*

In studying the political condition of the monarchy in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem during the reign of Amalric I (1163-1174), it becomes evident that there is a widespread acceptance of one particular pattern of development. This common view is that the monarchy in twelfth century Jerusalem appears to have undergone a development in three stages:

1. from 1100, the date of the establishment of the Outremer state, to the middle of the twelfth century, the monarch held a rather weak, or somewhat stagnant, position in which the king was considered to be little more than the baron or highest among the great barons of the kingdom;
2. from the mid-twelfth century reign of Fulk (1131-1143), and especially during the reign of Amalric I, to the beginning of the reign of Baldwin IV (1174), a fundamental change in the condition of the monarchy is noted as the ruler elevated his position by strengthening his power so that he sat alone in the seat of final authority; and
3. from 1174 to the close of the century, and well into the thirteenth century, the monarchy weakened and descended into the bed of stagnation whence it had risen in the first portion of the twelfth century.

In general, this common view notes that the ruling body that wielded the effective authority and power in the Jerusalem monarchy during much of the twelfth century was the Haute Cour. This high council of state was presided over by the king and its members were the major barons of the land. This view is accepted here. What is not accepted, however, and is, therefore, the object of analysis, is the historical interpretation of the position of the monarchy during Amalric's reign detailed in (2) above. The intent in the following pages is to describe the reign of Amalric while noting his role in strengthening the Jerusalem monarchy. Secondly, it will be noted that Amalric's reign, notwithstanding its appearance as a period throughout which the king carried and enforced the final political authority in the state, did, in truth, manifest little more royal power and authority than reigns preceding and following.

The most significant and informative event in the reign of Amalric substantiating the common interpretation that Amalric had powers exceeding those of the Haute Cour is the issuance of the Assise sur la ligece in 1163. It is a well known point in the common view that, before 1163, the Haute Cour and its baronial element occupied the seat of effective authority in the Latin state:

> Il est vraisembable qu'ils n'avaient aucune périodicité, se réunissant sur convocation du roi. C'était encore une institution embryonnaire, que tenait du conseil de guerre, du tribunal et de l'assemblée délibérante; nous savons aussi qu'elle avait une activité législative puisqu'on y établissait les 'assisses'. C'était là que les barons et les chevaliers pouvaient faire pression

> sur la royauté, encore que cette pression ne dût être sensible que sous royauté faible.[50]

The last sentence above indicates that its author believes that a strong ruler need not have succumbed to the pressure from the barons. According to the same author, Amalric was such a ruler:

> L'autorité royale avec Amaury I fait vraiment du royaume de Jérusalem une monarchie, et avec lui la dynastie d'Ardenne-Anjou ressemble à celle des Capétiens de France.[51]

Proof of Amalric's strong rule is often provided by citing the Assise sur la ligece. This assize, which bears Amalric's name, has been generally examined with a view towards national and monarchical developments. In this way, the assize appears to be a successful attempt by Amalric to ally with the rear-vassals of the kingdom against their lords, the barons in the Haute Cour. Prior to the promulgation of this assize, rear-vassals were linked to the throne only by way of their individual lords who were, in turn, the direct vassals of the king. This, it would seem, undermined the power of the barons. That the king could issue such a decree would definitely indicate that royal power now far exceeded that of the barons.[52] Further, according to the interpretation of the Assise sur la ligece offered, the accomplished purpose of the Assise consisted in a general enervation of baronial power.[53] This interpretation of the Assise sur la ligece lends support to the view that Amalric, in alliance with the rear-vassals, effectively diminished the power of the great lords. From the Assise, the rear-vassals obtained the right to seek redress in the Haute Cour for any loss of their feuda, total or partial, caused by their overlords.[54] Since the rear-vassals were more numerous than the barons, and since the Assise appears to have admitted the rear-vassals into the Haute Cour, the rear-vassals would seem to have provided the king with the means by which he could dominate the barons and prevent their obstruction of the advance of royal power. According to this view, the monarchy's power was ensured by the support from the rear-vassals in the Haute Cour. Nor does there seem to be any lack of evidence that the rear-vassals exercised their newly gained power. Beugnot rather bitterly notes that they often took advantage of their new position:

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[50] Richard, Le Royaume latin . . . , p. 89.

[51] Ibid., p. 79; Cahen, "La féodalité . . . ," pp. 172-173 supports the view that assize would help a strong king and weaken a weak ruler.

[52] La Monte, Feudal Monarchy . . . , p. 22.

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[53] Ibid., pp. 22-23 citing LaMonte's view is worth repeating: 'The effects of Amaury's assize were far reaching. It made all holders of fiefs liegemen of the king and consequently peers of each other . . . . It brought all fief holders under the jurisdiction of the king's High Court and removed them in part from that of their suzerain's court baron. Any vassal who was disseised by his lord could appeal to the King's court and the King was bound to protect him and not allow him to be disseised except by the decision of the court. If the mediate lord refused to plead his case in the King's court, the King reinstated the arriere vassal in his lands as the case would be considered as having gone to him through default.

'Liege homage was reserved to the king; all other homage should reserve the liege homage to the king. Any homage taken to a lord of Jerusalem was not legally liege homage, even though no specific reservation had been made, as liege homage in Jerusalem could be taken only to the king. If a vassal holding fief from any of the greater lords did not offer his liege homage to the king within a year and a day after receiving the fief the king would disseise him of his fief which reverted to the mediate lord . . . or, if he was not disseised, he at least lost all the advantages of the assizes and was wholly subject to his lord without redress.

'The assize protected the arriere vassal against his mediate lord by allowing him redress in the king's court, But it also protected the king against the greater barons as the arriere vassals could be used as a lever against them. If the lord were summoned to appear in the king's court and did not go, it was the duty of his vassals to urge him to go and warn him that if he did not answer the king's summons within forty days they would affealt themselves from him and place themselves directly under the king. The king was bound to compensate the arriere vassals for any losses they sustained if they affealted themselves in this manner. . . .

'If the quarrel between the king and the lord came to open war, the vassals should demand that the lord take his case to the High Court within forty days, and in case of refusal should affealt themselves and serve the king against him, as in the case of refusal to answer the king's summons. But if the lord agreed to take the case to the court the vassels were obligated to support him and to fight for him if justice was not done him in the court.'

> Si un vassal se rendrait coupable de quelque méfait contre son seigneur, il n'était justiciable que par ses compagnons, ses amis, ses frères d'armes, par ceux qui avaient le plus d'interêt à le trouve innocent. Si au contraire le seigneur committait une injustice quelconque envers l'un de ses vassaux, s'il était seulement en retard de lui payer sa solde le vassal, au lieu d'aller, comme en France et dans toute l'Europe, se plaindre au suzerain de son seigneur, réunisssait ses pairs et tous ensemble venaient gager le seigneur, ou lui declare que puisqu'il ne voulait pas faire justice à l'un d'entre eux, tous ils l'abandonnaient; et, en effet, a partir de ce moment, ils ne lui devaient plus rien, ni fidélité, ni service militaire, ni service de cour. Le seigneur qui, en Orient surtout, avait un si

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[54] M. W. Baldwin, "The Latin States under Baldwin III and Almaric I, 1143-1174," A History of the Crusades, I (Philadelphia, 1955), 549.

> grand interêt à ne pas perdre le service des ses hommes, puisque ses domaines étaient sans cesse exposés aux attaques ou aux courses des Sarrasins, se trouvait donc à la merci de ses propres vassaux.[55]

Phillip of Navarre was also concerned with the advantages gained by the rear-vassals:

> . . . dans le royaumes de Syrie et de Chypre, le loi consitutive des fiefs avait éprouvé quelques atteints; mais . . . par opposition à ce qui passait en Europe, ses atteints étaient tout a l'avantage des vassaux.[56]

The accepted view, then, is that the Assise sur le ligece was both:

1. a manifestation by Amalric of the power of the monarchy in Jerusalem in the mid-twelfth century since it was issued by the king and, of significance, was accepted and approved in the Haute Cour by the very individuals whose power it sought to limit; and
2. a means by which the king gained the support of the rear-vassals in the kingdom, support made effective by the Assise itself, in further limiting baronial power.[57]

However, the above interpretation is not the only determining factor behind the view that Amalric ruled supreme in Jerusalem. Other developments also provide evidence. Amalric has been credited with the institution of two commercial and maritime courts, the Chaîne and the Fonde.[58] Prior to Amalric's reign, one of the baronial privileges was the right to hold court and enforce justice over the bourgeoisie who lived in towns and ports located on the baron's holdings as well as over the rear-vassals.[59] Amalric, however, not only established the commercial and maritime courts which allowed the bourgeoisie a certain amount of self-control, but also claimed the proceeds and revenues from litigation in these courts for the royal treasury. Further, Amalric was well known for his acceptance of gifts offered by litigants desirous of favorable verdicts.[60] These incomes could well have aided in swelling the royal treasury.

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[55] M. Le Comte Beugnot, "Assises de Jérusalem, I: Assises de la Haute Cour," Recueil des Historiens des Croisades, I (Paris, 1841), XLVII.

[56] Ibid.

[57] La Monte, Feudal Monarchy . . . .

In addition, reference has been made to Amalric's efforts in increasing his domain. More often than not, Amalric's methods of gaining new lands were more those used by strong rulers than those used by weaker ones.[61] William of Tyre also refers to Amalric's rather ruthless methods of increasing his own lands and wealth:

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58. Baldwin, op. cit., p. 85 although Patterson appears to refute this claim and places their origins in the reign of Baldwin II.

59. Richard, Le Royaume latin . . . , p. 85.

60. Ibid., p. 78.

61. Ibid., p. 79 noting that in 1166 when Gautier of Beyrouth sought financial aid from Amalric in order to ransom the former's mother from Moslem captivity, Amalric agreed on terms which provided him with ownership of Gautier's lands. Gautier was given possession of the much smaller holding of Blanchgarde.

> . . . the wealth of his subjects was far from safe for again and again he took advantage of the most trivial of pretexts to make serious inroads upon their patrimony.[62]

Still more evidence has been presented to support the monarchic interpretation of Amalric's reign. One event of importance was the somewhat casual acceptance of Amalric's son, Baldwin IV, as his successor in 1174. That Baldwin, a child and a leper, could succeed his father without opposition in the Haute Cour would seem to indicate that the hereditary right of the dynasty had been established.[63] Cited as further proof of Amalric's power is his northern trip to meet Manuel I Comnenus in 1171. Amalric, always anxious to pursue an offensive military campaign in the south against the Moslems, in that year broke the established custom of the kingdom that the ruler remains within the kingdom's frontiers by journeying north to Byzantium to meet his ally, the Byzantine Emperor. Amalric's purpose was to plan a new southern venture without first having obtained the approval of the Haute Cour.[64]

It cannot be denied that the above developments, as presented, cast a spotlight on Amalric while leaving the barons in the shadows. The vital substance of this interpretation rests on the Assise sur la ligece. Yet, the Assise may more accurately be interpreted in a manner that presents it as a predictable event in the logical development of the state of Jerusalem rather than as an event highlighting a startling new development in the history of Outremer. The previously noted interpretation supports the view that Amalric's reign, in the twelfth century, resembled developments which were simultaneously appearing in Europe. Yet, to suggest that an institution such as a strong monarchy developed in Jerusalem concurrent with similar developments in Europe requires far more substantial evidence than that which has been presented. European monarchs of later centuries may have utilized the support of the lesser nobility to strengthen their respective positions but their predecessors in the twelfth century found themselves unable to initiate or maintain such a policy.

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[62] WT, XIX, 2.

[63] La Monte, Feudal Monarchy . . . .

[64] Richard, Le Royaume latin . . . , p. 78.

Doubtless, the issuance of the Assise sur la ligece provided Amalric with the deceptive appearance of a strong monarch. We should, however, examine the purposes and results of two earlier assizes, the Assise de Teneure and the Assise de Vente, in order to evaluate properly the Assise sur la ligece.[65]

In 1100, Godfrey de Bouillon issued the Assise de Teneure.[66] This decree provided that any landlord, owing service for his land, who left his land and did not return for a period exceeding a year and a day would lose his rights to his land to anyone who might claim them. Since this assize created a means by which anyone could easily and legally lay claim to land held by an absentee landlord, it can be assumed that such landlords found themselves automatically dispossessed. The reason behind the issuance of the Assise de Teneure lay in the need of the state, as represented in the king, to maintain a strong military force. Evidently, there was a tendency among landlords owing military service and allegiance to the king to leave their lands whenever there was a threat of Moslem attack.[67]

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[65] Prawer, "The Assise de Teneure . . . ," pp. 77-87.

[66] Richard, Le Royaume latin . . . , p. 68 contends that the Assise de Teneure was initiated during the early years of Baldwin I's reign.

It was not overly difficult for a landlord to leave his lands and remain away for several years. Most landlords, and particularly the great barons, rarely possessed demesne lands which would have required their constant attention and presence.[68] Therefore, the Assise de Teneure appears to have been designed to assure the state of its military might. The

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67. Prawer, ibid., p. 79: (Jean d'Ibelin) 'remembered having heard . . . that (the Assise de Teneure) was specifically established to punish those having heritages in the Kingdom, who ran away when the kingdom was in danger and there was nobody to defend it, but on receiving good news from the Kingdom came back to revindicate their property. Therefore, the year-and-day restriction was established to make their claims void. What the jurist probably had in mind were events described by William Archbishop of Tyre, in his history of the first years of the Kingdom. He complained of the trend to re-emigrate from the country, a real flight which left the Kingdom defenceless.'

68. Helen Preston, Rural Conditions in the Kingdom of Jerusalem during the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries (Philadelphia, 1903), p. 38.

men supplying this strength, and the landlords owing liege homage, constituted the bulk of the army in the twelfth century and would now not be able to evade service for a period lasting longer than a year and a day.[69]

Nevertheless, another assize issued soon after presented the means by which holders of _feuda_ could circumvent the _Assise de Teneure_. This _Assise de Vente_ stipulated that no holder of a _feudum_ could sell or otherwise alienate himself or be alienated from ~~his~~ property without first appearing before the _Haute Cour_ to give his consent to the transaction. Nor could a landlord sell or be disposed of his land except through mediation by the _Haute Cour_.[70] Any landlord, therefore, whose land was claimed by another in accordance with the rules set down by the _Assise de Teneure_, had only to claim a violation of the _Assise de Vente_ in order to preserve his own rights. The _Assise de Vente_ allowed the holders of the _feuda_ to circumvent the _Assise de Teneure_.[71]

The _Assise sur la ligece_ provided that:

1. in cases in which rear-vassals claimed that their lords were dispossessing them, the vassal would automatically regain the land if the lord did not appear in the _Haute Cour_ for mediation;

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[69] Richard, _Le Royaume latin . . ._, p. 89.

[70] Prawer, _ibid_., pp. 83-84.

[71] _Ibid_., pp. 85-87 noting that the _Assise de Vente_ applied only to holders of _feuda_ and, therefore, the _Assise de Teneure_ was somewhat effective in restricting the movements of the possessors of free lands. The latter, however, continued to leave as evidenced by the issuing of further restrictions on their movements in the thirteenth century.

2. if a lord did not appear before the Haute Cour within forty days, when summoned, his vassals were required to remove themselves from fealty to the lord and place themselves under the King's overlordship; and
3. all rear-vassals were to direct their liege homage to the king.[72]

The first two stipulations above removed the circumventive ability of the Assise de Vente; landlords could now be dispossessed of their land without appearing before the Haute Cour. Any vassal could claim dispossession, whether or not the land was his, and win possession if the challenged lord did not appear before the Haute Cour. Provision (2) above is a logical one since no vassal would maintain fealty to a dispossessed lord.

Amalric's assize was issued to prevent the Assise de Vente from being used by holders of feuda to circumvent the Assise de Teneure. The latter and the Assise sur la ligece had common origin in the desire to guarantee the military strength of the kingdom. Provision (3) above further implements this desire by providing direct service from the rear-vassals. No longer could a rear-vassal claim that he could not support the king because his own lord refused to do so. This concern with the military, rather than the administrative, position of the monarchy must be noted.

The Assise sur la ligece, issued after Amalric's 1163 war with Gerard of Sidon discussed below,[73] has been viewed as adding further evidence of increasing royal strength since it bound rear-vassals directly to the crown, admitted all vassals to the Haute Cour where they could demand justice if it had not already been given by their lords and, lastly, requiring fealty oaths to the king from the bourgeoisie on seignorial lands whenever the king so directed. Yet, the previously noted noble class social differentiation and rise in political influence had been reflected in several baronial uprisings and some dimunition of the royal position. Amalric's own disputed succession to the throne may be seen as another illutration of the nobles' challenging the royal position and prestige. Despite the support of a few nobles and the majority of the clergy and people,[74] Amalric was forced to compromise with the nobles before assuming the throne.[75] It is most unlikely that these noblemen, who had forced their new king to repudiate his wife before his coronation, would now agree to an assize aimed at reducing their power.

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[72] La Monte, Feudal Monarchy . . ., pp. 22-23.

[73] Grandclaude, "Liste d'assises . . . ," p. 339, n. 44; Richard, Le Royaume latin . . ., pp. 78, 81.

Further, in punishing Gerard of Sidon, Amalric received wide support from the nobility. Gerard's arbitrary dispossession of one of his vassals could not have been sufficiently significant for a royal levy of the feudal army or the baronial support which followed.[76] In all probability, Gerard's piratical activities based at Sidon invoked a strong royal displeasure culminating in a feudal levy ostensibly to correct the act of dispossession without judgment.[77] Amalric's actions would then fit the socio-political climate of crusader developments. Gerard's renewal of fealty to the king and restoration of the dispossessed lands, brought about through the mediation of the great nobles, may be interpreted as further illustrating baronial political influence at a time when the king is alleged to have wielded the greatest power. The Assise sur la ligece, seen in this light, would now appear to be the juridical expression of another baronial encroachment on a former royal power, rather than the opposite.

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[74] WT, XIX, 1.

[75] Ibid., XIX, 4 and XXI, 1.

[76] Ibid., XIX, 2 notes Amalric's disinterest in theoretical principles: 'His greed for money was greater than was seemly or honorable in a king. By free use of gifts, he often acquired it and still more often retained it quite

Thus, to see within the widened Haute Cour membership any democratization or medieval parliamentary development in

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contrary to the demands of strict justice and right.' E. Meynial, "De quelques particularitiés des successions féodales dans les Assises de Jérusalem," RHD, XVI (1892), 408 ff. notes profit possibilities for the nobles in Amalric's allowing those with more than one fief to hire knights to perform the required military service, thereby allowing the development of great noble families and fortunes; Prawer, "La noblesse et le régime féodal . . .," pp. 52, 58 and n. 39 places the right to hire knights in the 1131-1163 period but concurs with the idea that the nobles expected to profit; ------, "Les premiers temps . . ." and ------, "Etude sur le Droit . . ." ascribes baronial involvement against Gerard to the nobles' desire to end the royal right to dispossess without judgment, the offense for which Amalric was punishing Gerard.

[77] Richard, Le Royaume latin . . . , p. 84.

which the king gains new allies - the rear-vassals - in a contest with the political influence of the major noble families, is not a justifiable interpretation of the facts. Weighted voting in the Haute Cour emphasized the influence of the great lords and assured their control.[78] No representative system was planned to assure the lowest nobility voice and vote in the Haute Cour. Under the assize, rear-vassals were granted the right to seek justice in the Haute Cour only when their lords refused them any justice or condemned them without due judgment. However, since appeals to the Haute Cour of cases decided on the seignorial level were not allowed, all the seignorial lords had to do to protect themselves from appearances in the Haute Cour now guaranteed their vassals was to judge the vassal's case. Since the lord's control over his own seignorial court was immense, owing to the personal and financial nature of the obligations due him from knights who composed its membership, it was unlikely that decisions adverse to his interests would be reached. Except in cases involving an arbitrary violation

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78. Prawer, "La noblesse et le regime féodal . . . ," p. 60; ------, "Estates, Communities . . . , " p. 378 and n. 8 ascribes voice and vote in Haute Cour deliberations exclusively to tenants-in-chief although the knights now had the theoretical right to participate; Richard, Le Royaume latin . . . , pp. 119 ff. adds that the juridical system structure by 1163 - Haute Cour, Cour des Bourgeois, Chaîne, Fonde, ecclesiastical courts, consular courts and local feudal courts - implied a dimunition of royal control which is reflected in the wide degree of non-uniformity in the court system.

of precedent, the great lords were safe in their local power.[79] The judicial guarantee of the assize, requiring the collective action of the now enlarged *Haute Cour*, was a remote possibility when one considers the many demands made on the time of the lesser nobility. The necessity of attendance to receive justice was a sufficient obstacle to permanent lower noble representation in the *Haute Cour*.[80]

The assize further granted the king the right to demand oaths from the bourgeoisie on seignorial holdings whenever he suspected the vassal of rebellion.[81] However, this oath had been used on several occasions during the previous decades.[82]

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79. Prawer, "La noblesse et le régime féodal . . . ," pp. 60-61 notes that vassal's sole option after judgment was in accusing judges of false judgment and, thereafter, engaging each in single combat on the same day - certainly not an inviting option.

80. WT, XXII, 23 notes 1182 general tax levy decision made by the major nobility (interpreted from 'barons of the realm'), lay and ecclesiastical, with little mention given as to how the people and lower nobility were involved in consenting; Röhricht, *Regesta Regni . . .* , docs. 397, 400, 412, 449, 450, 452, 453, 465, 466, 467 show no definite group pattern of attesting charters thereby rejecting view that king used a specific council of advisors in favor of an unfixed, changeable assortment of major officials including: Humphrey of Toron as Constable, Philip of Milly, William the Marshall and Frederick, archbishop of Tyre.

81. Jean d'Ibelin, c. 140 (*H. Cr.*, *Lois*, I, 215), c. 199 (*ibid.*, p. 320); Sidon and Beaufort were so required after the war with Gerard of Sidon.

82. *Cartulaire de l'Eglise de Saint-Sepulchre de Jerusalem*, E. de Roziere ed. (1849), no. 131 notes fealty oath to canons of the Holy Sepulchre taken by their subjects in 1155 which specifically reserved their fealty to the king; Delaville le Roulx, *Cartulaire . . .* , I, 117 no. 144 notes donation of Raphana to Hospitallersby Raymond of Tripoli in 1142 in which bourgeoisie were required to swear fealty; Riley-Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 452; Prawer, "La noblesse

It would appear that key elements of the Assise sur la ligece alleged to have strikingly demonstrated an increase in royal power - the bourgeois fealty oaths and rear-vassal immediatizing, represent instead the codification of existing practices. This would serve to support further the description of increased baronial powers previously noted.

The intimate relationship of the military situation in Outremer to the juridical developments abovementioned must also be noted. Of continuing concern during Amalric's reign was the strengthening of Latin control over the lands south of Jerusalem. Egypt was the hoped for goal. Amalric engaged in an active campaign for southern expansion during one-third of his reign while coping with the rising Moslem threat during the other years.[83] Amalric's southern offensive had been foreshadowed by the campaigns undertaken by his brother, Baldwin III. Baldwin had entrusted the valuable southern lands of Jaffa and Ascalon to his brother. It is logical to assume that, as a result, Amalric's attention was

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et le régime féodal . . . ," p. 65 and ------, "Colonization Activities . . . , " p. 1096 ff. show similar oath-taking at Mahomaria in 1155; Röhricht, Regesta Regni . . ., doc. 366 notes Baldwin III in 1161 reserving liege homage to him for his vassal John Gomman who was being mediatized by the granting of Outre-Jordain to Philip of Milly.

[83] Schlumberger, Campagnes . . . , p. 17; 'le gouvernement d'Amaury presente une physionomie toute spécial parmi les autres regnes des rois de Jérusalem. Il fut speciale-ment et presque uniquement consairé à d'audacieuses tentatives de conquête de l'Egypte.'

to be focused on the south. Moslem fortification to the north and east of the kingdom further intensified the plans for southern expansion. Control of Egypt was the key element as well in the Moslem drive to encircle the crusaders, particularly after Nūr-ad-Dīn's union of Aleppo and Damascus.[84]

Since the kingdom's military preparedness was in such a low state at the time, the most pressing need was for centralization and organization of the armed forces. Before Amalric's reign, the king's power in wartime was no more effective than in periods of peace.[85] Moreover, the Moslem threat loomed larger during Amalric's reign. Concern for personal, financial and national security stirred the already fevered atmosphere of the kingdom. Therefore, in approving the Assise sur la ligece, the barons were subject to this persistent pressure for a means by which the armies might be strengthened. The baronial concern with the Moslem danger was real. During Amalric's reign, the barons participated in several campaigns beyond the borders of the realm. Participation of this type was limited to those ordinarily rare times when the needs of the state demanded total commitment.[86]

Amalric, therefore, rather than elevating or strengthening his power or position, used the Haute Cour to accomplish his and the kingdom's military purposes. The alleged powers which the Assise sur la ligece provided him were, actually, privileges granted in order to strengthen the kingdom's military might. These privileges were not irrevocable. The barons were reserved the traditional right to revolt if they did not receive justice in the Haute Cour,[87] or if the king extended his newly-gained powers to the disadvantage of the barons. Further, the monarchs of the post-1174 period were reduced to the level of primus inter pares when the weight of the Moslem victories had crushed the baronial determination to campaign aggressively.

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[84] Baldwin, "The Latin States . . . ," p. 549.

[85] Dodu, Histoire des Institutions Monarchiques . . . , p. 173.

[86] La Monte, Feudal Monarchy . . . , p. 155.

Much of the additional supporting evidence for the previously held older view that Amalric's reign brought a dramatic increase in royal power is also subject to reevaluation. Amalric's involvement in the acquisition of land and material wealth was a natural continuation of the monarchical process common to all European states. Furthermore, charged with the obligation of regulating and maintaining the armies, Amalric was expected to reimburse the lords for their military service outside the realm.[88] That Baldwin IV received ready acceptance as Amalric's successor was an expected development. Naturally weak, Baldwin would be unable to offer resistance to the revitalized strength of the barons. The baronial resumption of control over the

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87. Ibid., p. 23 noting that in such a justifiable revolt, the vassals were bound to support their lord.

88. Ibid., p. 155.

affairs of the kingdom was emphasized by the forced resignation of Raymond of Tripoli as regent for Baldwin IV.[89] The monarchy further weakened its position in the succession struggle at the end of Baldwin IV's reign. In securing the throne, Sybilla and Guy de Lusignan forfeited the accumulated royal prestige of the previous rulers. This loss was accentuated in 1186 by Renaud de Châtillon's refusal to acknowledge the validity in his territories of a royal truce with Saladin,[90] as well as by Raymond of Galilee's independent treaty with Saladin allowing Islamic passage through his possessions.

To sum up, a consideration of all the facts on Amalric's reign suggests an interpretation different from that traditionally held. Amalric's declaration gained for him the appearance, although not the real authority, of a strong monarch. This view is made clear by exposing the intent of the Assise sur la ligece. The spotlight of power in Outremer must again focus on the Haute Cour and its baronial composition while placing Amalric in his proper and more modest role in the monarchical continuum of Outremer.

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89. Baldwin, Raymond III . . . , Chapter V.

90. Le Livre d'Eracles in H. Cr., Occ. II, 34: 'que aussi estoit il sires de sa terre, come il (Guy) de la soe et que il n'avoit point de trive as Sarrasinz.'

3. Ecclesiastical Developments

Perhaps the major reason behind the retention of Outremer as an integral part of Western Christendom was the success of the medieval papacy. The spiritual hegemony over the European scene maintained by the papacy was the result of a papal consolidation of powers, both spiritual and temporal.

> While the Church had theoretical supremacy over the Kingdom of Jerusalem and while its privileges were extensive and lands broad, Jerusalem was perhaps better off in relation to the Church than most European states. For on the whole, Jerusalem can be said to have had far more freedom from papal interference and control than a position as a vassal state of the papacy would lead one to expect.[91]

Not only was there relatively little intervention by the papacy, there was considerable assistance supplied by the Church in the form of men, money and moral support. The extent of ecclesiastical exemption in the Outremer Kingdom may have been compensated for by the strength of the military orders and the support provided by the papacy.

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[91] La Monte, *Feudal Monarchy . . .*, p. 46. The question of vassalage will be examined below. Concerning ecclesiastical history of the Latin Orient: S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, II (Cambridge, 1952-1954), 310-314; La Monte, *Feudal Monarchy . . .*, pp. 203-216; Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord . . .*, pp. 308-326, 501-526; M. W. Baldwin, "Ecclesiastical Developments in the Twelfth Century Crusaders' State of Tripoli," *Catholic Historical Review*, XXII (1936-1937), 149-171; L. de Mas Latrie, "Les Patriarches Latins de Jérusalem" and "Les Patriarches Latines d'Antioche," *Revue de l'Orient Latin*, I-II (1893-1894), 16-41, 192-205; J. Richard, "Note sur l'Archidiocèse d'Apamée et les conquêtes de Raymond de Saint-Gilles en Syrie du Nord," *Syria*, XXV (1946-1948), 103-108; J. G. Rowe, "Paschal II and the Relation between the Spiritual and Temporal Powers in the Kingdom of Jerusalem," *Speculum*, XXXII (1957), 470-501; R. Devresse, *Le Patriarchat d'Antioche* (Paris, 1945), pp. 119-123, 162-201, 305-308.

The inauguration of the crusades was largely the result of four major considerations:

1. the desire to liberate the Holy Land and return the Holy Sepulchre to control by the Roman Catholic Church;
2. the utilization of the crusading militarism against the Saracens to assist the Byzantine Empire and the union of all churches;
3. the establishment in the Holy Land of a Christian state with some form of ecclesiastical, theocratical or feudal ties with the papacy; and
4. the desire of the papacy to demonstrate the extent of its power and influence.[92]

It is reasonably clear that Pope Urban II understood that the Christian Commonwealth was being threatened by the Mohammedan advance; the Pope's motive, therefore, may have been a desire to launch a counter-offensive.[93] The crusaders were soldiers of the cross who were recruited under ecclesiastical supervision, commissioned by the Pope and protected by the power of the Church. Serving the Church in the war against Islam, "the Latin Kingdom in the Holy Land, with a Latin Patriach in the See of Jerusalem, signaled the triumph ~~of~~ papal policy."[94]

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[92] La Monte, "La Papauté et les Croisades," Renaissance, II-III (1945), 156.

[93] M. W. Baldwin, "The Papacy and the Levant During the Twelfth Century," Bulletin of the Polish Institute of Arts and Science in America, III, (1945), 278. Concerning the papacy and relations with the crusaders: D. C. Munro, "The Popes and the Crusades," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, LV (1916), 348-356; La Monte, "La Papauté . . . ," 154-167.

Yet, papal policy was to undergo a change in the twelfth century. With the accession of Alexander III (1159-1181) to the papacy, legal studies were revived: both canon and civil law were examined. Popes steeped in law were "not exempt from protracted struggles with the Holy Roman Emperor, nor forgetful of ecclesiastical reform."[95] Refining the administrative techniques of papal government was a contribution of these pontiffs. As a result, papal contact with secular rulers became more formally diplomatic emphasizing legal procedures and precedents more than in previous periods.

Papal administrative responsibilities in the Levant included supervision of the Latin hierarchy, church discipline and disputes, adjudication of appeals from the local ecclesiastical courts and providing for the growth of both the military and the monastic orders.

In general, the Latin clergy in the Outremer States served under conditions akin to those of their counterparts in Europe.[96] Papal legates continually journeyed to the Holy Land in order to assure the orderly administration of the Levantine territories.

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[94] La Monte, Feudal Monarchy . . . , p. 203.

[95] Baldwin, "The Papacy and the Levant . . . ," 277-278; Fliche et Martin, IX, 2 deals with pontificate of Alexander III.

However, the Latin Kingdom should probably not be considered as a papal fief.[97] The early theocratic claims of the papal legate, Daimbert, were emphasized by his feudally investing Bohemond of Antioch and Godfrey of Bouillon with their lands and titles. Yet, the election of Arnulf as patriach in 1112 served to deny Daimbert's policy.

> Thanks to him, the unworkable scheme envisaged by most of the participants in the First Crusade, by which Jerusalem should become a theocracy, with a monarch merely as a minister for defence, was finally and utterly abandoned.[98]

On the other hand, Pope Honorius II reconfirmed the granting of the kingdom to Baldwin II in 1128. Also, the Venetians obtained a charter of privileges as payment for the siege of Tyre in 1123 and required all of the important clerics to sign the charter but were willing to accept a mere due of lay signatures - those of the Constable, William de Bury, and the Chancellor, Payens.[99] This would imply that the Venetians considered the kingdom to be a papal fief and

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96. Baldwin, op. cit., p. 286.

97. Ibid., pp. 281-283 in which Baldwin examines the entire question of papal suzerainty and concludes that there is a lack of evidence to support such a claim; Richard, Le Royaume latin . . . , however, considers the claim worthy.

98. Runciman, A History of the Crusades, II: The Kingdom of Jerusalem (Cambridge, 1952), p. 85.

99. WT, XII, 25, 552-556; also 556, n. 79.

would, therefore, only accept Church guarantees. Yet, records providing further indication of this link with Rome are not to be found; absent from the evidence are further claims to suzerainty by the papacy or admission of these claims by the Jerusalem monarchs. The Liber Census of 1192 listing all vassal territories of the papacy does not include the Kingdom of Jerusalem nor does the pope figure as the sole selector of the regent or the successor to Baldwin V. It should be correct to conclude that "papal political influence over the Latin Kingdom, possibly, though certaintly effective early in the century, did not continue."[100]

Before arriving at Jerusalem, the Crusaders had already thought about founding Latin churches. The similar internal organization of the various churches in Outremer - chapters in which deacons, archdeacons, chancellors and treasurers were generally to be found - lends support to the advance preparation noted above.[101] Church justice, dispensed by ecclesiastical courts, operated under the rules of canon law in use throughout Europe. Their jurisdiction embraced all clerics - regular and secular clergy, friars and the religious orders - and it dealt with all matters concerning Catholic faith, marriage, churchmen and church property, heresy, adultery, legitimation and the licensing and practice of all doctors.[102] Crimes requiring death sentences were excluded from ecclesiastical judgment and handled by the Haute Cour. In cases where there was a conflict between clerics and laity, the royal agents and jurors sat with the ecclesiastical judges to reach a decision.

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[100] Baldwin, op. cit., p. 283.

[101] Cahen, La Syrie du Nord . . . , pp. 317-318.

The papacy frequently exercised its responsibility as arbiter of disputes when called upon by the Italian communes to re-establish disregarded privileges granted to them by treaties. A lengthy correspondence during the pontificates of Alexander III and Urban III attempted to force Amalric to restore the Genoese privileges and the plaque in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre which enumerated them.[103] It might be of note to add that these entreaties were unsuccessful for, as late as 1186, letters were still being written to secure the Genoese request.

In the traditional organization of the Latin Kingdom, the Patriarch of Jerusalem could and did influence many of the activities of individual lords as well as the state. While the position of chief religious officer of the kingdom entitled the holder to be present on all decision-making occasions, his influence was strengthened by his honorific position within the Church hierarchy and occasionally reinforced by the prestige of Rome when he was also the papal

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102. La Monte, Feudal Monarchy . . . , pp. 109-110, 214-216.

103. Liber Jurium, i, docs. 254-255, 322, 345-350; Röhricht, Regesta Regni . . . , doc. 438; La Monte, Feudal Monarchy . . . , p. 207.

legate.[104] General papal policy in this period was to invest as patriarchs those prelates who already occupied sees in Europe since the honorific patriarchate required revenues and resources which would only be had by members of the episcopate.[105] Yet, there is evidence that families of clerics composed the majority of the Latin clergy in Outremer.[106] While these families created few, if any, new bishoprics, they managed to secure many rich and/or strategic clerical posts for their many relatives in a manner similar to current practice in Europe.[107]

As was to be expected in an age when strong-willed individuals influenced the exercise of power, the personality and ability of the man determined the strength of the Latin Patriarch. Daimbert of Pisa, a dedicated supporter of Urban II and a forceful man, brought order to the discordant elements after the First Crusade and promulgated a patriarchal policy of religious conformity based upon Latin orthodoxy and the exclusion of all native and Orthodox Christians. The monarchy and the settled nobility, however, followed a more temperate program of toleration and aid to the other Christian sects. Although every patriarch to follow in the period under study, was born and brought up in the West, it is difficult to accept the view that "none of them had any sympathy for the Orientals."[108] Living in such close proximity tended to ameliorate the rigid contrasts with the eastern Christians and Moslems for which the Latins were preconditioned. Some of Outremer's Queens were Orthodox Christians and their patronage and influence was decidedly directed toward the eastern sects.[109] Manuel I assisted in the 1169 repairs made on several holy places by sending Byzantine artists and craftsmen.[110] With such a pattern of toleration toward the eastern sects, patriarchs following a hostile program of enforced conformity with Latin practices would have been foolhardy.[111]

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[104] Daimbert (1099-1102) and Warmund (1118-1128) had served in both positions. Concerning the ecclesiastical structure in Outremer: Devresse, Le patriarchat . . . , pp. 194-201, 305-308 discusses ecclesiastical structure in province of Tyre prior to the founding of Islam: J. Richard, Le Comté de Tripoli sous la Dynastie Toulousaine (Paris, 1945, pp. 58-62 discusses the episcopal churches of Tripoli and ------, Le Royaume latin . . . , p. 97 notes that Latin episcopate expanded slowly in the Latin Kingdom.

[105] L. deMas Latrie, "Les Patriarches Latins de Jerusalem," Revue de l'Orient Latin, I (1893), pp. 16-18.

[106] Richard, Le Royaume latin . . . , pp. 94ff.

[107] Ibid.

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[108] Runciman, *The Eastern Schism: A Study of the Papacy and the Eastern Churches during the XIth and XIIth Centuries*, (Oxford, 1965), p. 88.

[109] Arda of Armenia (Baldwin I), Gabriel of Melitine (Baldwin II), Theodora of Byzantium (Baldwin III) and Marie of Byzantium (Amalric I) were Orthodox; the first pair were Armenians of the Orthodox rite and the second pair were Byzantine princesses. Queen Melisende, daughter of Baldwin II and wife of Fulk I, had an eastern upbringing and was noted for her support of the native Christians and the Abbey of Saint Sabas - (see Runciman, *The Eastern Schism*, p. 89; WT, XV, 26, 132-134, notes that Melisende also endowed the convent at Bethany headed by her sister, Ivesta, with possession of Jericho.)

[110] Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, III, 379-381. Repairs were made on the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, the Holy Sepulchre and the Chapel of the Dormition on Mount Zion.

The ecclesiastical province of Jerusalem embraced several ancient dioceses under its jurisdiction including the suffragan bishopric of Lydda established in 1099.[112] The priory of St. Abraham (Hebron) was established within the see of Jerusalem in 1168. In 1169 the ancientbishopric of Jaffa was re-established by Patriarch Amalric de Nesle as a result of King Amalric's interest in his former county. The Latin suffragans under the Jerusalem Patriarch included the five archbishoprics of Tyre, Nazareth, Caesaree, Le Crac and Basra as well as nine bishoprics.[113] Territorial conflicts with the Patriarch of Antioch occurred throughout the twelfth century as a religious extension of the political maneuvering between the Antiochene princes, their suzerain-king of Jerusalem and the Byzantine Emperor.[114]

Papal dealings with the kingdom served to restrain patriarchical ambitions in order to maintain the dominance of Rome. The Jerusalem patriarchate with its wealth, apostolic tradition and sacredness associated with the Holy City might

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111. An exception to this pattern occurs in the Patriarchate of Antioch, discussed below.

112. Richard, Le Royaume latin . . . , pp. 95-96.

113. Ibid.

114. John G. Rowe, "The papacy and the ecclesiastical province of Tyre, 1100-1189," Bulletin of the John Ryland's Library, LIII (1960), 160-189 notes the ecclesiastical differences between the two patriarchates and papal treatment of the two provinces.

have been considered as a potential rival to Rome. Privileges of immunity from jurisdiction were granted to the religious orders and major abbeys in the Latin Kingdom, freeing them from patriarchal control and placing them in direct dependence upon the papacy. In order to prevent patri~~ar~~chical ascendance, general papal procedure was to support the secular position in order to prevent an ecclesiastic state dominated by an independent patriarch.[115]

However, the above should not imply the existence of a protracted conflict between ruler and patriarch.[116] While the king wielded influence in church matters - the election of bishops and appointments to benefices - the general patriarchal position appears to have been one of close cooperation with the ruler.[117] This position is reinforced by the accepted royal practice of selecting the patriarch from two candidates proposed by the canons of the Holy Sepulchre.[118]

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115. La Monte, "La Papauté et les Croisades . . . ," p. 158; ------, Feudal Monarchy . . . , p. 205.

116. La Monte, Feudal Monarchy . . . , pp. 208-209; Dodu, Histoire des Institutions Monarchiques . . . , pp. 358-360 presents an outdated view based on the first three decades of the kingdom which indicates a bitter struggle; Longnon, Les Français d'Outremer . . . , pp. 121, 134, 154 cites patriarchal self-concern as a hindrance to royal policy.

117. WT, XVII, 30, 287-288 notes Amalric's use of Amalric, Patriarch of Antioch, as bailli in 1160 while Bohemond III was held captive.

118. La Chronique d'Ernoul, ed. L. Mas Latrie (Paris: Societe de l'Histoire de France, 1871), pp. 83-84.

Monasteries dotted the countryside during the twelfth century as all crusading elements - papacy, monarchy, nobility and merchants - hastened to erect some visible proof of their religious fervor. The Amalfi merchants were most active in this phase of the crusades constructing the church of Notre Dame in Jerusalem as well as the attendant monastery of Ste. Marie Latina and nunnery of Ste. Marie-Madeleine de la Latine.[119] They were soon to add the hospital of St. Jean Baptiste and establish small abbeys near the Temple, the Mount of Olives, Mount Zion and Josaphat. Antioch was also a major monastic center resulting from its apostolic foundation, the numbers of neighboring eastern churches and monasteries and the great wealth of the trading community. The Byzantine abbeys of Saint Paul, Saint Georges and Saint Simeon were established and Augustinian canons were to be found at Saint Georges.[120]

The extent of church holdings in Outremer in April 1166 is noted in the official fonds provenant of the Cathedral of Barletta.[121]

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119. Richard, Le Royaume . . ., p. 97.

120. Cahen, La Syrie du Nord . . ., pp. 323-326.

121. F. Chalandon, "Un diploma inedit en Amaury Ier, Roi de Jérusalem en faveur de l'Abbaye du Temple-Notre-Seigneur," Revue de l'Orient Latin, XVIII (1900-1901), pp. 311-317. In this act, Amalric confirmed the many possessions of the monastery and conceded new privileges; the document remained in the possession of the archbishop of Nazareth who was transferred to Barletta.

4. The Religio-Military Orders

The orders of the Hospital and the Temple were of great influence in governingthe kingdom. Originally founded to provide comfort and protection for the pilgrims in the holy areas, the orders' almost supra-legal position served as another weakening element in the Latin Kingdom. Their independence was a divisive factor. The religio-military order of the Hospital was to be found supplying the visions for Amalric's dream of Egyptian conquest. The role of the Assassins is of great importance in extending the life of the Crusader Kingdom. Allegedly traitors to the Islamic faith, the Assassins' terrorism forced the Sunnite leaders to expend great energy in attempting to control the organized campaign of murder by the Nazari Ismailians. It is understandable, therefore, that this preoccupation would limit the force Islam could raise against the Christians. Amalric's realization of the value of the Assassins' activities is illustrated by his quarrel in 1173 with the Templars over their refusal to surrender the murderers of the envoys from the Assassins. The legal independence from royal justice claimed by the order prevented the probable royal plan for increasing Assassin disruptive activities among the Sunnite Moslems.

a. The Hospital

Against the background of western Europe's age of feudal militarism, the crusade movement may be seen as a pilgrimage of arms. Christendom's soldiers, strengthened by spiritual and juridical sanctions, had advanced ideologically from their noble, yet base, feudal combat to a higher spiritual form of warfare. St. Bernard's defense of the military orders, De Laude novae militiae, prepared especially for the Templars, lent great prestige to their activities. Although criticized for their militarism and material acquisitions, the orders tended to claim that their warfare was religiously oriented and their possessions were designed to serve God. Since the orders were military forces under the direction of the central church government, they were preferred to the less disciplined knights more often attracted to the crusading movement.

The foundation of the Hospitaller order rests with the merchants from Amalfi who, in the mid-eleventh century, built or rebuilt the Jerusalem monastery of S. Maria Latina near the Holy Sepulchre. The Italian Benedictines of this monastery, by 1080, expanded their operations by opening the convent of S. Mary Magdalene (later S. Maria Majora) and a hospice dedicated to either St. John the Baptist or St. John the Almoner.[122] The order acted with a degree of limited independence after the initial crusade, was rewarded with royal favors and papal recognition was received in 1113.[123] The order received grants from the Latin nobility as well as from the Jerusalem patriarchate.[124]

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[122] J. Delaville Le Roulx, Les Hospitaliers en Terre Sainte et à Chypre (1100-1310) is a basic study presenting narrative in chronological style without analytical overview; H. Prutz, Die geistlichen Ritterorden presented international view of military orders detailing privileges, political and economic involvements and social development although brief in treatment of Latin Syria; E. J. King, The Knights Hospitallers in the Holy Land illustrates Hospitaller activities and graphically discusses crusader fortifications; Jonathan Riley-Smith, The Knights of St. John in Jerusalem and Cyprus (1050-1310) (New York, 1967) presents a thorough examination of order's purposes, influence and activities; WT, XVIII, 4-5, pp. 241-245 notes Amalfitan foundation of S. Maria Latina

Hospitaller fame extended to Europe where gifts and grants were regularly received from the feudal nobility. The Hospital's fame identified it with the success of the crusading movement and the gifts enabled the order to establish a pilgrimage-route hospice chain.[125] In this fashion, the internationalization of the Jerusalem-based order began.

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not rebuilding and hospice dedicated to St. John the Almoner; Delaville Le Roulx, op. cit., pp. 7-10 notes older, Carolingian foundation for S. Maria Latina and, p. 27, notes hospice dedicated to St. John the Baptist.

123. J. Delaville Le Roulx, Cartulaire général de l'ordre des Hospitaliers de Saint-Jean de Jérusalem (Paris, 1891-1906), catalogs charters for the order; nos. 1,20, 28: Godfrey gave some property to the order which Baldwin I increased and ratified in 1110-1112; Paschal II's Pie postulatio voluntatis recognized the order's independence; J. G. Rowe, "Paschal II and the Relations between the Spiritual and Temporal Powers in the Kingdom of Jerusalem," Speculum, XXXII (1957) and ------, "The Papacy and the Ecclesiastical Province of Tyre, 1100-1187," Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, XLIII (1960) note royal-papal disagreement regarding territories belonging to the two patriarchs.

124. Cart., nos. 35, 29 detail scattered holdings and exemption from the payments to the patriarchate and the Archbishop of Caesarea. Baldwin I's 1112 confirmation of possessions is witnessed by the patriarch Arnulf.

125. Prutz, op. cit., pp. 17 ff. notes hospice locations at Asti, Pisa, Bari, Otranto, Taranto and Messina; Riley-Smith, op. cit., p. 40 discusses strategic location of these hospices as well as that of S. Gilles near Marseilles.

Contemporaneously, the first Hospitaller administrator, Gerard, emphasized the order's position as servants to the lordship of the poor. The Hospitallers' earlier background of aiding and protecting pilgrims was re-emphasized under Gerard's ideological direction. The first master's administrative ability was a key to the order's abovementioned internationalization as a charitable organization and his death in 1120 terminated the non-military phase of Hospitaller activity.

Raymond du Puy[126] as the new master, stirred the order to increase its possessions,[127] spiritual piety and Outremer activities and influence. The extension of possessions in Europe and Syria, while furthering the order's internationalization and adding to the strength of the organizational structure, established the Hospitallers' vast endowment and attendant power. Church granted privileges and exemptions freed the order from episcopal control.[128] The Hospitallers were solely responsible for the spiritual needs of their members, tenants, serfs, servants and patients. Exemptions were also granted allowing them to operate cemeteries and churches at all times, to be immune from excommunication and to a series of financial liberties relating to alms and tithes.

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126. Delaville Le Roulx, op. cit., p. 44; King, op. cit., p. 29; Riley-Smith, op. cit., pp. 43 ff.

127. Riley-Smith, op. cit., p. 45 noting provincial administration at S. Gilles, Messina, Castile-Leon, Portugal, England and Amposta.

128. Ibid., pp. 45-46 and sections III-IV note ecclesiastical liberties.

Raymond's major ecclesiastical contribution during his tenure as master was the rule he developed for the Hospitallers.[129] The conventual regulations were designed for an order expected to be in contact with the surrounding society and they were patterned upon the Augustinian rule with additions made in order to provide for a central government controlling the international possessions. Although the dating of Raymond's rule has not been defined other than in the period 1150-1158, its constant usage attested to its significance. Raymond's codification detailed the pattern of life and discipline for the brethren of the order, the organizational structure and duties of the administrators, the religiously ceremonial operation of the hospitals in caring for the ill and the zealously regulated alms collection. The priestly and lay brothers of the Hospital similarly vowed the tripartite oath, although the former held some degree of precedence over the latter.

The involvement with military activities probably began during Raymond's tenure. Providing protection for pilgrimage routes would be a natural outgrowth from the order's traditional hospital and charitable duties. The order achieved a prominent military position shortly after the 1136 grant of the castle of Bethgibelin near Ascalon.[130] They assumed the border defenses for Tripoli in 1144,[131] the right to fortify the northern stronghold of Platta,[132] involvement with the war council at Acre prior to the 1148 attack on Damascus,[133] a possessory interest in the castle of Kerak in Moab with the right to free passage on the Dead Sea ~~and~~ exemption from transportation taxes,[134] the major influence leading to victory in the 1153 siege of Ascalon,[135] the joint responsibility for the defense and expenses of Banyas,[136] and several grants of territories exposed to the

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[129] Delaville Le Roulx, op. cit., pp. 318-319; E. J. King, The Rule, Statutes and Customs of the Hospitallers 1099-1310; Riley-Smith, op. cit., pp. 45-51.

[130] WT, XIV, 22, 81-82; Delaville Le Roulx, op. cit., p. 47.

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131. Cart., no. 144 in which Count Raymond yields majority of La Boquée valley, including Crac des Chevaliers, Castellum Bochee, Lacum, Felicium and Mardabecg as well as the already lost towns of Ba'rīn and Rafanīyah, to the order without its owing him any feudal obligations. This was clearly motivated by military necessities since Raymond pledged to seek the order's consent in any arrangements he might make with the Moslems. Riley-Smith, op. cit., p. 67 and Richard, Comté de Tripoli . . . , p. 63 note Hospitaller possession of the count's rights over the Lake of Homs.

132. Cart., no. 313; Riley-Smith, op. cit., p. 56.

133. WT, XVII, 1, 185.

134. Cart., no. 207; Riley-Smith, op. cit., p. 56 noting that the lord of Montreal, Maurice, further granted them one-tenth of all spoils and tribute for their assistance in fortifying his Outre-Jourdain territory after 1152.

135. WT, XVII, 28, 229.

136. Ibid., XVIII, 12, 256-257 and H. A. Gibb, The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades (London, 1931), p. 330 ff. note Humphrey of Toron's difficulties in safeguarding this stronghold and trading mart, his decision to share with the Hospitallers, the disastrous defeat of the Hospitaller convoy of men and supplies for their new fortress and the subsequent return of Banyas to the sole protection of Humphrey.

Moslem threat.[137] In general, Hospitaller military involvement tended to deal with lands either too difficult for the feudal nobility to defend or already lost by these nobles. The latitude offered the order regarding profits, treaties and control of subjects may be seen as an inducement to accept these dangerous military assignments.

Hospitaller military developments may be the result of Templar influence as well as the product of the everyday needs of Outremer existence.[138] That the military activities abovementioned appear to spring from nothingness is but one tentative conclusion among several others.[139] Yet, it is unlikely that Fulk would have ceded Bethgibelin to an untried military force in 1136. The Hospitaller military officer, the constable, appears in the 1120's although his responsibilities may have been limited to supplying pilgrim convoys. Military activities are only briefly mentioned in the 1182 Hospitaller statutes yet William of Tyre chronicles the order's earlier involvements. The appearance of soldier-brothers during Raymond's tenure is reflected in his direct identification and equation of the Hospitaller movement with the crusades, particularly expressed when their military strength was deemed necessary to the survival of the kingdom. There was no differentiation between warrior and non-warrior brothers until 1206, thereby supporting the view that early Hospitaller military activities were performed by mercenary forces,[140] or by feudal vassals. Further confusing this issue is the Hospitaller promise to cede Crac des Chevaliers to King Wladislas of Bohemia, the appearance of soldier-brethren in 1140's and papal recognition of the Hospitaller knights in the 1150's.[141] It should be sufficient herein to note that while the Hospitallers increasingly shouldered military responsibilities during Raymond's mastership, their earlier role as a hospital for the poor and ill remained their dominant purpose. Raymond died between 1158-1160 while on a tour of the order's European possessions. He was succeeded by his companion Auger de Balben (1158/1160-1162), then by Arnold de Comps (1162-1163) and then by Gilbert d'Assailly (1163-1170).

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[137] Riley-Smith, op. cit., p. 57 notes donations in Tripoli in 1170 and 1180's, in Antioch in 1168 and in Egypt in 1168.

[138] Cahen, Syrie du Nord . . . , pp. 510-571; Richard, Le royaume latin . . . , p. 104; Riley-Smith, op. cit., pp. 54-55 tends to reject any early influence by Templars.

[139] Riley-Smith, op. cit., pp. 52-59.

Gilbert's tenure brought about an active Hospitaller involvement in crusader politics and military activities, largely owing to the master's own military background and to his close friendship with Amalric I and Amalric de Nesle, patriarch of Jerusalem.[142] Gilbert's administration brought the order numerous grants of land - Antiochene territory surrounding Apamea and the Orontes right-bank in 1168, the Egyptian city of Bilbais and other territories in 1168. Also, the order purchased - Eixserc in 1163, Belvoir in 1168 - or acquired a large number of castles and fortifications.[143] Attendant upon this expansion of possessions was a similar increase of the influence of the military element in the order, perhaps reflecting the master's own military interests. Hospitaller military influence was dominant in the county of Tripoli during Raymond III's decade of imprisonment at Aleppo and in Amalric's Egyptian campaigns, to be discussed later.

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[140] Ibid., pp. 57-58; John of Wurzburg's travel chronicle, p. 159, notes that the order 'sustains many persons in its castles, instructed in all the arts of war, for the defense of the lands of the Christians against the incursions of the Saracens'.

[141] Ibid., p. 58.

In 1169 or 1170, Gilbert unexplainedly resigned his magistracy and plunged the order, the kingdom and the church into confusion.[144] Gilbert's personality appears to have directed him away from worldly responsibility at this point. The warrior-brothers, led by the Grand Commander Pons Blanus, rejected Gilbert's resignation. Their appeal to the Jerusalem patriarch brought about the latter's unauthorized intervention into the episcopally independent order's activities. The patriarch ordered Gilbert, under the threat of excommunication, to return to office and not resign his position without papal consent, thereby arousing the brothers against episcopal interference. Those brethren opposed to Gilbert's military policies and expenses now demanded some control over Gilbert's future actions. The master's reply was a second resignation, this time with the forethought of having the brothers elect Cast de Murols as successor. Supported by Amalric I and the patriarch, the military group under Pons Blanus again rejected the resignation and appealed to the pope. To further complicate this situation, Gilbert now attempted to regain his magistracy by personally visiting Rome. Alexander III reinforced papal influence over the order by accepting Gilbert's resignation, Cast de Murols' election and the new rules limiting the authority of the order's masters.

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[142] King, *Knights Hospitallers . . .*, pp. 312 ff.; Delaville Le Roulx, *op. cit.*, pp. 65 ff.; Riley-Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-62, 69-70, 77-78.

[143] Riley-Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 79 notes pre-1160 possessions totalling 7 or 8 castles: Bethgibelin, Tamarin, Belfort, Castellum Bochee, Crac des Chevaliers, Felicium, L$_a$cum, perhaps Castellum Bovonis as well as assisting at Kerak and Chastel Neuf and claiming Ba'rīn and Rafanīyah; 1160's possessions totalling 11 or 12 castles: Belmont, Belveer, Castellum Emmaus, Belvoir, Turris Salinarum, Eixserc, Belda, Chastel Ruge, Shughr-Bakas, Rochefort, Cavea, perhaps Fonteines as well as claims to 6 others: Apamea, Abū-Qubais, Hūwajah, Arzghān, Basarfut, Lacoba and wall defenses at Sidon.

[144] *Ibid.*, pp. 61-63; Delaville Le Roulx, *op. cit.*, pp. 76 ff.; King, *op. cit.*, pp. 97 ff.

Cast de Murols' brief tenure (1170-1172) centered on restoring the financial solvency of the order. Gilbert's military ventures, particularly the Egyptian involvement, had left the order over 100,000 besants in debt. Cast's previous position as treasurer of the order undoubtedly played a part in his selection as master. By 1172, after responsions and alms had been transmitted by the order's European possessions, the Hospitallers' finances were sufficiently restored so that they could assist in paying Raymond III of Tripoli's

150,000 besant ransom. During the period of Raymond's capture, Amalric gave the castles of Archas and Gibelacar to the order. Since these fortifications controlled the Homs-Baalbek road and the coastal region, they were of major importance.

Jobert's magistracy (1172-1177) maintained the order's hospital and military position in Outremer, continued to press for the Egyptian venture, sustained influence with Raymond of Tripoli while assisting him after the unsuccessful attack on Homs in 1175 and redefined the activities involved in assisting pilgrims.

Roger des Moulins' tenure (1177-1187) concludes the period with which we are herein involved.[145] Perhaps a major contribution was his role in the troubled politics of the kingdom. He twice visited Europe seeking assistance for the Frankish states: to Sicily in 1179 and throughout Europe with the patriarch and the Templars' master in 1184. Hospitaller independence and privileges were reaffirmed and extended during his tenure. The close relationship with Raymond III of Tripoli was maintained as illustrated by Raymond's grants of the Tuban castle guarding the Homs road in 1180, the land between the La Boquée valley and the Orontes in 1181 and the right to Homs and the Orontes east-bank lands in 1185. Raymond's 1186 opposition to the coronation of Sybilla and Guy de Lusignan, in violation of Baldwin IV's will which ordered an international court to decide the issue of succession, received Roger's active support. Roger arranged for the purchase of Margat in 1186 in order to complete the order's defenses of the Antioch-Tripoli border against the Assassins and other nearby Islamic invaders. Although Betrand le Mazoir of Margat and Bohemond of Antioch were paid for Margat, unlike most other Hospitaller possessions, their possessory interest was as total a liege-lordship as that exercised in their other territories. Hospitaller presence at the kingdom's military councils was maintained. Involved in negotiations to reconcile Guy de Lusignan and Raymond of Tripoli in 1187, Roger accompanied the Archbishop of Tyre and the Templars' master to Raymond's castle, although warned by Raymond about the presence of Saladin's forces. Near Sephoria, the Templar Gerard de Ridefort rashly urged an attack against an overwhelming Islamic force and Roger des Moulins died in the ensuing disaster.

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[145] Riley-Smith, op. cit., pp. 64-65, 68, 74-75.

By 1187 then, the order had expanded both materially and in ecclesiastical privileges. The Jerusalem hospital and the order's pilgrim services were famous throughout Christendom. They had become a keystone in the political and military life of the kingdom, both in royal councils and on the battlefield. Their influence on the 1168 Egyptian campaign decision, to be discussed later, may have been their first major success in political lobbying. Their papal-granted ecclesiastical independence, the wealth derived from their international possessions and their military capabilities allowed their influence in the crusade world. Yet, an issue of papal concern over control of the order arose in the late 1160's-1180's. As previously noted, Gilbert's resignation was brought to papal attention. Alexander III in 1169/1170, in 1172 and in the 1178 Piam admodum et jugem re-emphasized the lordship of the poor, frowned upon military activity except at moments of danger and ordered a limitation on the master's right to expand the order's military possessions.[146] The Hospitallers' subsequent efforts were directed at demonstrating their continued concern for charitable activities - as in the 1182 statutes - while, through spurious documents as well as the military exigencies of the area, accentuating their military prominence and stability. The disasters in the 1180's brought home this point, recognized the Hospitallers as being entitled to the indulgence for crusaders and tacitly accepted their military activities.

b. The Temple

The order of the Temple was founded by Hugh de Payens (Paens). It was recognized by Baldwin I, granted use of a chapter house within the confines of the Temple of Solomon and adopted as its chief purpose the guarding and supply maintenance of pilgrimage routes.[149] Hugh, related to the counts

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146. Ibid., p. 76.

147. The sources of information for the Templars are limited: M. d'Albon, Cartulaire général de l'ordre du Temple, 1119-1150 (Paris, 1913-1922) catalogs grants although most early documents have been lost; E. G. Leonard, Introduction au cartulaire manuscrit du Temple, 1159-1377 (Paris, 1930); Henri de Curzon, La régle du Temple, in Société de l'histoire de France, LXXVI (Paris, 1886);

of Champagne and friendly with the family of St. Bernard of Clairvaux, joined with eight knights, including Geoffrey de St.-Omer, in order to safeguard pilgrims to the Holy Land. In 1119, they voluntarily pledged to serve the patriarch of Jerusalem, swearing the vows of chastity and obedience, and the king, from whom they had received their chapter-house. Hugh, perhaps influenced by Count Hugh of Champagne who had joined the order in 1125,[148] wrote St. Bernard in 1128 asking him to develop a rule for the order. Baldwin II's support for the order provided Hugh with the necessary prestige for a European trip designed to gain public recognition and material support. Bernard's rule was sanctioned that same year by the Council of Troyes. The order's membership was to be of three classes: knights, drawn from the nobility; sergeants, drawn from the bourgeoisie; priests. A temporary knightly service was also permitted, allowing nobles the opportunity, benefit and prestige of serving under the Templar banner without total commitment to the order's tripartite vow for the remainder of one's life. The hierarchical organizational structure which the order developed was headed by an elected grand master and his major officers - the marshal and

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John Charpentier, *L'ordre des templiers* (Paris, 1944); M. Melville, *La vie de templiers* (Paris, 1951); Paul Alphandery, *La chrétienté et l'idée de croisade* (Paris, 1954); E. Lambert, *L'architecture des templiers* (Paris, 1955); Pierre Ponsoye, *L'Islam et le Graal* (Paris, 1957).

[148] Richard, *Le Royaume latin . . .*, p. 105.

several commanders. This group directed the order's many activities and held occasional chapter assemblies.

By the 1130's, widespread recruitment in Europe rapidly expanded the order into an international operation with large, fixed resources. St. Bernard's inspirational and organizational role in the Second Crusade - designed to ensure the Christian foothold in the east, strengthen the papal position in international politics and cleanse the individual spirit of Europe's feudal warrior - simultaneously served the order's proselytic needs. His De laude novae militae had already raised the role of the knight-ecclesiast to one of epic proportions: defenders of the true faith; knights beyond all reproach; freedom from local seignorial or ecclesiastical interference; zealous guardians of the religious places and their visitors; humble knights of Christ. Along with their first privileges freeing the order from local taxes and ecclesiastical control was one allowing the building and staffing of churches answerable only to the pope. This allowed the development of a religious competition in Outremer for the lucrative incomes and endowments received by churches.

Paralleling the commitment to protect pilgrims was the order's development of a banking operation. The European branches accepted money deposits credited to the depositors for receipted withdrawal in Outremer. This banking role became most instrumental in the success of the order's rapid growth and position as an international finance organization. The tripartite vows maintaining the poverty of Templar brethren and masters, however, served to guard and enhance the order's prestige. Similarly, the military skill and effectiveness of Templar forces earned wide respect.

The loss of the early documents concerning Templar activity restricts our knowledge of twelfth century developments, although it may be stated that castle-building was a major activity until 1150. The order controlled the wall fortifications of Gaza by 1150,[149] received many grants in the county of Tripoli and guarded the northern area of the principality of Antioch. They held several castles: those of St.-Jean-Baptiste, Quarantaine and Tour Rouge (Maldouin) near Jericho; between Lydda and Cacho (Caco); Cacho; La Fève south of Nazareth; several fortified places along the Gaza frontier with Egypt and the Outre-Jordain frontiers including the grotto of al-Raqîm al-Kahf (al-Raquim), Ahamant and the region of la Belqa;[150] Saphet in northern Galilee after 1165 and Jacob's Ford after 1178. They also maintained and outfitted several hospices along the pilgrim routes.

Occupying the circular-domed, octagonal-walled former al-Aksa mosque and Temple of Solomon, the order was known as *militi templi*, *frères du temple* or *templier*. Succeeding Hugh as master, Robert de Craon served the growing order well through his organizational and diplomatic abilities. Everard des Barres was the next master, during the period of the Second Crusade, and his abilities earned the admiration of Louis VII of France. St. Bernard's uncle, Andre de Montbar, added his family's great prestige to the order when he served as the next master, although his resignation in favor of the contemplative life at Clairvaux cut his service short. Bertrand de Blancfort's administrative capabilities next served the order, followed by the 1169 election of Philip de Milly, lord of Naplouse and Outre-Jordain. Philip's magistracy initiated a change since the previous masters had held a total commitment to the order, removed as they were from worldly interests. Philip resigned in 1171 and directed himself thereafter at an independent policy contrary to the best interests of the monarchy and the kingdom. Eudes de St.-Amand, formerly viscount of Jerusalem in 1160-1161 and Seneschal in 1164, next served as master and demonstrated his mastery of the techniques of temporal power. Eudes acted to prevent the exercise of royal justice over the order, built the castles of Châtelat and Jacob's Ford despite a royal agreement with Saladin not to construct new frontier forts and generally followed an independent course of action. Eudes' capture in 1179 and subsequent death was followed by the election of Girard de Ridefort. Girard's policies continued the pattern set by Eudes in working for the order's benefit, rather than serving the best interests of the kingdom.

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[149] Grousset, *Histoire des Croisades . . .*, II, 339.

[150] Delaville Le Roulx, "Chartes de Terre Saint," *Revue de l'Orient latin*, XI (1907), 183 noting confirmation by Amalric on February 16, 1167.

Amalric had several difficulties with the Templars.

In 1166, he ordered the hanging of a dozen brethren responsible for surrendering an Outre-Jordain castle.[151] The murder of the Assassin envoy to Amalric in 1173, to be discussed later, by a group of Templars under Gautier de Mesnil's leadership was followed by Amalric's siezing Gautier, for whom Eudes de St.-Amand had already prescribed penance, and imprisoning him in Tyre.[152] While these actions tend to support the previously discussed interpretation of Amalric as a strong ruler, it must be noted that the Templars' actions in the abovementioned events certainly received no groundswell of approval. Loss of a valued fortification and termination of a possible military alliance with the Assassins, both military matters of great baronial and royal concern, could only be viewed as most serious while Amalric's actions should be seen as predictable, justifiable and taken with baronial support.

c. The Assassins

The Assassin order developed from the Ismaili sect of the Shiite branch of Islam.[153] The Ismailites were founded after Ismail, the son of the sixth Shiite imam, Jafer al-Sadīk, predeceased his father. This event had not been prepared for in Shiite theology and split the movement. Major support was given to Mūsa, al-Sadīk's next eldest son. An active minority located in Persia and Mesopotamia supported Ismail's son Muhammed and adopted the name Ismailis. Abdallah ben Maimon became imam in the late ninth century, added mystical and political overtones to the movement and

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[151] Richard, Le royaume latin . . . , p. 110.

[152] Grousset, Histoire des Croisades . . . , II, 477, 598.

[153] H. A. R. Gibb, "Notes on the History of the Early Crusades," Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies (U. of London, vol. vii. IV (1935), 754 notes need to re-examine history of the order from the view of the eastern sources; ------, The Damascus Chronicle . . . , pp. 179-180, 187-188 examines views of the 12th-14th century Islamic writers toward the Assassins; D. S. Margoliouth, "The Devil's Delusion of the Ibn al-Jauzi," Islamic Culture, IX (October, 1935), 546-557 notes

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al-Jauzi's attitude toward Assassins; ------, "Assassins," *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics* treats entire subject; "Résumé de l'histoire des croisades tiré des Annales d'Abou'l-Feda," *H. Cr.*, *Orient.*, I, 6 presents Abū l'Fida's views; M. N. Adler, *The Itinerary of Benjamin of Tudela* (London, 1907) chronicles Benjamin's notes on the Assassins observed on his journey through the Levant in 1160's-1170's; WT, XX, xxix examines Assassin submission to their leader's will; D. Schaffner, *The Relations of the Order of the Assassins with the Crusaders During the Twelfth Century* (Unpubl. Thesis, U. of Chicago, 1939); D. B. MacDonald, *Development of Moslem Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory* (New York, 1903) notes Ismailis' appeal to Shiite followers as well as appeal to Persian nationalistic anti-Arabism or to free-thinking nihilism; Husain F. Al-Hamadani, "The History of the Ismaili Da'wat and its Literature during the Last Phase of the Fatimid Empire," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (January, 1932) examines role of Hasan ibn Sabbah in Syrian developments; W. Ivanow, *A Creed of the Fatimids* (Bombay, 1935) has been criticized by Margoliouth's "The Devil's Delusion . . . ," and by P. K. Hitti, *History of the Arabs* (London, 1937); "Ridwan," *Encyclopedia of Islam*, III (London, 1936), 1154-1155 examines protective role played by the prince of Aleppo; B. Lewis, "Sources for the History of the Syrian Assassins," *Speculum*, XXVII (October, 1952), 495 ff.; C. Nowell, "The Old Man of the Mountain," *Speculum*, XXII (October, 1947), 497 ff.; Marshall G. S. Hodgson, *The Order of the Assassins· The Struggle of the Early Nizari Ismailis against the Islamic World* (Mouton & Co., The Hague, 1955) presents a very thorough analysis of the order's development, theories and activities.

expanded its activities in order to bring about Islamic submission to the Ismaili imamate.[154] The Berbers of Tripoli and Tunis brought North Africa under Ismaili control after their conversion in 909. Egypt soon followed in 969 and the new Ismaili empire of the Cairo Fatimid dynasty wielded power until Saladin's conquest in 1171.

The late eleventh century witnessed the development of a Persian Ismaili sect in Syria and Persia under the leadership of Hasan ibn Sabbah.[155] When the Caliph Mustansir (d. 1094) chose his second son, al-Mustali, as successor rather than his eldest son, Nizar, Hasan supported the claims of Nizar. Since al-Mustali was supported by the caliphate's armies under the leadership of his father-in-law, Badr al-Jamali, Nizar's followers fled to Persia where they named their leader caliph. In 1090, Hasan's Ismaili followers captured the north Persian stronghold of Alamūt. Hasan's and Ismaili influence spread rapidly in the Persian areas being disputed by several Seljuk sultans. Hasan's group, and theirsuccessors, now known as the Assassins as will be discussed below, maintained an active influence in the Persian-Syrian area until their 1256 destruction by the Mongols under Hūlaku.

This religio-social movement was maintained, therefore, outside the scope of general Islamic acceptance and within a society increasingly hostile and unacceptable to their way of life. Shiites viewed themselves as a "saved remnant in a corrupt world."[156] Secrecy heightened the dramatic pattern of their lives in an alien world of Sunnite community solidarity. They were secret dissenters in a world where conflicting minorities were rejected.

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[154] MacDonald, op. cit., pp. 127 ff.

[155] al-Hamdani, op. cit., pp. 127 ff.

God, according to Assassin theology, is unreachable through the use of man's reasoning powers. Universal reason and love, primal matter; time and space all interfere with this human reasoning. The key to reaching God is revealed through six major prophets - Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, Mohammed - as refined by the seventh imam, Muhhamed ibn Ismaīl. This seventh stage of revelation examines the inward reasoning of the enunciated divine and prophetic laws and was termed the Esoteric Doctrine. From this search for instruction developed the use of advanced guides known as the Batinis (Inwarders). Batinite Koranic instruction sought to reveal the inner meaning of each word to a chosen elite submissive to the Ismaili imamate.[157] This allegorical ascertaining of religious truth for the initiated invigorated the movement with an elitist zeal. Hasan's revitalization program did not, however, reform Ismaili dogma. The expansion program undertaken during Hasan's leadership was successful in Syria largely due to the protection afforded them by the

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156. Hodgson, Assassins . . . , p. 8.

157. Ivanow, op. cit.; Margoliouth, "Assassins"; Hitti, op. cit., pp. 442-443.

prince of Aleppo, Ridwan.[158] That Syria contained a variety of religions, Moslem and Christian, also influenced Assassin acceptance. Aleppo's Shiite population was in the majority in marked contrast to the Sunnite majority of Damascus. Ridwan's death in 1113 and succession by a young son, Alp Arslan, not inclined to being hospitable toward Assassin advances, temporarily set back the movement. Arslan's death in 1114 restored the Assassin position in Aleppo but a need for security led them to Banyas, southwest of Damascus, in 1126. They lost Banyas three years later, next capturing Kadmus in 1132. From this latter castle, between Hama and Margat in the Nosairis Mountains, they soon expanded their power over ten surrounding castles of Antioch.[159] The relocation of Assassin activities out of the cities changed them into a mountain-oriented community at war with the world. As such, they had little appeal or influence in the cities of Syria. By withdrawing to their fortifications, they relinquished influence over the daily decisions of Islamic leadership. It is with this group of Syrian Assassins that the crusaders were to deal.

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[158] "Ridwan," Encyclopedia of Islam, pp. 1154-1155.

[159] WT, XX, 29, 39; Cahen, Syrie du Nord . . . , pp. 352 ff.

The Assassin name has been variously explained.[160] Western sources, although William of Tyre gives no information about their naming,[161] may be credited with the term since Moslem writers prior to the thirteenth century do not use it. Arabic sources use the Ismailis or Batinis terms when referring to the movement.[162]

Assassin-Crusader involvement begins with the assassination of the lord of Homs in 1103 allowing Raymond of St. Gilles to besiege Emese and receive tribute.[163] Tancred conquered Apamea from the Assassins in 1106.[164] Baldwin II's 1129 attack on Damascus was preceded by a wholesale massacre of the Damascene Assassins by the local government.[165] The acquisition of Kadmus, previously noted, and Masyāf (1140-1141) firmly established the Assassin influence in the area contiguous with Antiochene and Tripolitan possessions. The

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160. Margoliouth, "Assassins"; Nowell, *op. cit*., Hodgson, *Assassins . . .* , pp. 133 ff.; Anna Comnena, *The Alexiad*, VI, 12 *in Corpus Scriptororum histoiriae Byzantinae* (Bonn, 1839), p. 317 uses the term Khasii; Bejamin of Tudela, *op. cit*., pp. 16-17 calls them Hashishim; WT, 29, p. 39 calls them Assissini; Silvestre de Sacy, "Memoire sur la dynastie des Assassins," *Mémoires de l'Institute royal, classe d'Histoire et de littérature ancienne*, IV (Paris, 1818) presents classic view of name derived from use of hashish.

161. WT, XX, 29, 39.

162. *H. Cr*., *Orient*.; Ibn al-Kalānisī, Imad al-Dīn, Usamah ibn-Munqidh, Kamal al-Dīn and Ibn al-Athir use abovementioned terms while Abū Shāmah refers to the movement as Assassins.

163. W. Stevenson, *The Crusaders in the East* (Cambridge, 1907), p. 54; Röhricht, *Geschichte . . .* , p. 34; Grousset, *Histoire des Croisades . . .* , I, 339, 387.

164. Stevenson, *op. cit*., p. 82; Röhricht, *Geschichte . . .* , p. 34.

165. Grousset, *op. cit*., I, 658-662.

1152 assassination of Raymond II of Tripoli led the crusaders into a retaliatory wholesale massacre of the native Levantine inhabitants.[166] Baldwin III's 1157 attack on Shaizar was abruptly ended either by quarrels among the crusaders or by an Assassin attack.[167] Benjamin of Tudela chronicles a series of Crusader-Assassin conflicts for the 1167-1171 period, during which time William of Tyre estimates their numbers to be in excess of 60,000.[168]

A major Assassin embassy to Amalric I in 1173 is noted by William of Tyre.[169] William states that the Assassin envoys offered their conversion to Christianity in return for the termination of their annual tribute to the Templars in the region of Tortosa, southwest of the Assassin strongholds. Amalric is said to have welcomed this opportunity to strengthen the Frankish borders, perhaps even willing personally to pay the tribute of 2000 gold pieces. However, the Assassins were murdered by Templars in an ambush as they returned from the royal negotiations. The occasion for mutual assistance was not to appear again. Amalric's anger with the Templars'

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166. WT, XVII.

167. Ibid., XVIII, 18 notes former view; Abū Shāmah, Grousset and Röhricht support the latter.

168. WT, XX, 29, 39.

169. Ibid., XX, 29-30.

precipitate action was ineffective since Templar ecclesiastical exemption prevented the king from exacting revenge. The Assassin overture under Rashīd al-Dīn Sinan's leadership, may be explained by noting Nūr-ad-Dīn's recent successful destruction of the Fatimid caliphate and union of the Cairo-Baghdad-Moslem world. Sinan would, therefore, have been seeking crusader assistance in order to maintain Assassin power and influence in Syria.[170] However, Nūr-ad-Dīn was not hostile to the Assassin leader as illustrated by Sinan's recognition as Ismaili protector in Aleppan territories.[171] Also, since William of Tyre's description of the proposed alliance shows little Assassin assistance offered for the crusaders' alliance, perhaps the event should be considered as an attempt to develop lines of communication and some degres of future mutual assistance. The latter view is reinforced by the 1162 direct assumption of the Nizari imamate by the Alamut leader, Hasan ibn-Muhammed (1162-1166). Hasan's imamate and subsequent break with contemporary Islamic faith and customs, allowed Sinan's Syrian movement to assume an

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170. Grousset, *op. cit.*, 598-602; P. Hitti, *History of Syria* (New York, 1951), p. 611 offers view that this was authorized dissimulation (taqiyah) of the Shiite movement's extremists.

171. Kamal al-Dīn, *L'Histoire d'Alep*, trans. E. Blochet in *Revue de l'Orient Latin*, IV (1896), 148.

independent policy in religious and political activity.[172]

The Assassins are generally held to have had a program of political murder which wreaked havoc upon orthodox Moslem security. This atmosphere of insecurity, coupled with the attendant social, political and religious disunity, served the best interests of the Latins.[173] However, the basically secure relationships between the order and Zengi, Nūr-ad-Dīn and Saladin point elsewhere. It is unlikely that this security could exist where political murder was the rule of thumb. That the assassinations appear to be purchased by political enemies rather than the inspiration of Assassin leaders,[174] does not detract from the deliberate insecurity fostered in the Islamic and Christian worlds by Assassin daggers. That this insecurity was of concern is attested to by the numerous Moslem and Christian literature dealing with the Assassin order.

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[172] Sinan's surname, Rashid al-Dīn, means "orthodox in religion"; Hodgson, Assassins . . . , p. 157, notes that Hasan's proclamation of the Qiyâma ending the world and resurrecting the dead fulfilled Ismailism, withdrew it from the current Islamic worlds and, thereby, admitted defeat for the Ismaili goal of controlling Islam. The subsequent rule of Muhammed II (1166-1210) was geared to the preaching of the Qiyâma, the developing of a new spiritual life for the Ismailis directed toward the figure and person of the imam and, lastly, establishing a less militant outlook for the movement.

[173] Grousset, op. cit., terms Assassins as the equalizing balance between Frankish and Moslem worlds.

[174] Hitti, History of Syria, p. 610.

CHAPTER III

MILITARY ACTIVITIES

1. Military Operations to the Rise of Saladin

Warfare in the Middle Ages was something like a game of chess. In particular, the Crusader Kingdom witnessed the gathering of armies on flat desert expanses where each side would thrust and parry at the other. Moves and studied countermoves were the order of battle, while it was not unusual for either side to cease hostilities in order to allow the levied troops to return to their farm lands to till the fields. Armed conflict was more seasonally oriented, fought in a simple and direct contact fashion. Sieges of defended castles were of vital importance since the castle was the military center of any territory.

Both the Latin and Moslem leaders understood that the value of military operations in the desert lay in the subsequent capture or control of vast territories. Often, such control could be gained or maintained through the strength derived from one military strongpoint; the seigneury of Outre-Jordain and the county of Jaffa-Ascalon illustrate this principle. The latter, in particular, was instrumental in orienting Amalric's military policies towards an Egyptian offensive. Five major attempts at conquering the lands of the Shiite, Fatimid Caliph were made between 1163 and 1169; several other advances were begun during the remainder of Amalric's reign. The extent of these campaigns lends credence to the belief that "Jerusalem could be won on the banks of the Nile."[1] Control of the vast Egyptian territories would eliminate the southern threat to the kingdom, would prevent an encirclement of the Crusader States by the Sunnite Syrian Moslems and would enrich the Latins through their control of the great wealth derived from Egypt's commercial activities.

Amalric's southern offensive was the most sustained Frankish military operation since Baldwin II's campaigns against Aleppo and Damascus some forty years earlier.[2] Each attack against Egypt was met by a counter-offensive from the Syrian Moslems under Nūr-ad-Dīn. The Moslem ruler of Syria was aware that the decay in Egypt made it ripe for conquest and that, with this victory, control of the East would soon follow. Perhaps the major pre-occupation of Amalric's reign, therefore, was the campaign for control of Egypt.[3] Bilbais (1163), Alexandria (1167), Bilbais and Cairo (1168), Damietta (1169), Darum and Gaza (1170), the Gulf of Akaba and Aila (1171) and Krak (1171-1173) provide evidence of Amalric's military aims. Of these, the most significant of Amalric's campaigns was the operation against Egypt in 1167.[4]

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[1] R. Smail, Crusading Warfare, p. 22.

[2] Ibid., p. 34.

[3] Ibid., p. 42 and Bongars, 1182 no. 23 note Amalric's deep interest in Egypt, his letter to Louis VII of France notifying the latter of Latin success in Egypt in 1163 and his request for additional French assistance for the crusaders.

[4] Schlumberger, Campaignes . . . , pp. 107-168.

1167 can be considered as the pivotal year of Amalric's reign. His failure to win Egypt in the concentrated campaign of this year ended the Frankish opportunity to become undisputed masters of Egypt.[5] William of Tyre notes that the opposing forces were unequally matched;[6] Shirkuh's forces consisted of 12,000 Turks, of whom one-quarter were lightly outfitted with bows and arrows while the remainder were heavily clad in breastplates and helmets, and 11,000 Arab lancers. Amalric's forces consisted of 374 knights and several light cavalry Turcopole units whom William of Tyre termed "for the most part, useless."[7] The king had left his infantry behind in order to press forward with his knights. The two armies formed ranks and, William notes, the veterans rallied the new troops into battle.[8]

Shirkuh's tactic had been to keep the Nile between his forces and Amalric; this had led Amalric to cross the river, forcing Shirkuh to withdraw south to Upper Egypt. Amalric pursued with his cavalry, as described above, and met Shirkuh's army at al-Babein. The Moslem forces had selected good positions where the cultivation ended and the desert began. Amalric then fell into the classic military flanking trap set by Shirkuh when the Latins advanced against Shirkuh's retreating center without protecting their flanks from attack by the Moslem forces.[9] Amalric committed a tactical blunder when he separated from his infantry since this allowed his cavalry to be defeated on March 19, 1167 at al-Babein.[10] William of Tyre considered the battle to be indecisive since the overall tactics of the engagement were not observed by those taking part, since victory and defeat occurred simultaneously and since Amalric was able to retreat to safety by crossing the river.[11]

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[5] Smail, Crusading Warfare, pp. 184-185.

[6] WT, XIX, 25, 331-334.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 331

[8] *Ibid.*

The attempt to win Egypt did not stop. The port city of Alexandria was quickly besieged after the retreat from al-Babein. Shirkuh and his forces were blockaded by Latin land and sea forces, but Shirkuh was able to slip out at night with most of his army.[12] The besieged city was defended by Shirkuh's nephew, Saladin. During this battle, the Latins erected a tall tower built from ships' masts in order to be able to observe the activities of the defenders.[13] Petraries, catapults capable of throwing large stones over great distances, were used and everything in the way was destroyed. William of Tyre notes that since the Alexandrians were traders, not soldiers, the Turks were unwilling to rely on their assistance and, therefore, were reluctant to fight.[14]

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[9] Schlumberger, Campaignes . . . , pp. 136-146.

[10] Smail, Crusading Warfare . . . , pp. 131-132; WT, XIX, 24, 331 and n. 54.

[11] WT, XIX, 25, 333-334.

[12] Ibid., 26, 334-335.

[13] Ibid., 28, 337-339.

[14] Ibid., 338.

Saladin urged the citizens to resist until Shirkuh could return to relieve them but this aid never materialized. Seeing the hopelessness of the situation, Shirkuh arranged for peace and the withdrawal of all forces from Egypt. The hostilities ended, Alexandria opened its gates to welcome the besiegers and Saladin was accorded full honors in Amalric's camp. William of Tyre marvels at the thought that a Christian army of 4500-5500 men, of whom only 500 were knights, could successfully besiege such a major city in which there were over 50,000 fighting men available.[15]

One year later, October-November 1168, Amalric again appeared in Egypt.[16] The Latin forces besieged Bilbais and then Cairo. The capture of the former was followed by a devastating massacre of the defenders.[17] The Egyptian vizier, Shawar, began immediate negotiations with Amalric while, at the same time, urgently requesting Nūr-ad-Dīn's assistance.[18]

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[15] Ibid., p. 342.

[16] Ibid., XX, 5-6, 349-352.

[17] Runciman, A History of the Crusades, II: The Kingdom of Jerusalem (Cambridge, 1952), 381. Runciman attributes the massacre to the newly arrived crusaders from Nevers whose count, William IV, had died at Acre just prior to the campaign. See WT, XX, 3, 347. William of Tyre (XX, 6-7, 351-353) makes no attempt to identify those guilty of the wanton destruction except to imply that this "outrageous enterprise" may have been unnecessarily caused by the desires of Gilbert d'Assaily, Master of the Hospitallers (XX, 5, 350).

[18] WT, XX, 6-9, 351-356.

Nūr-ad-Dīn gave Shirkuh 200,000 dinars, arms and animals, allowed him to select 2000 soldiers from the regiments (askars) and offered an extra twenty dinars per regiment to cover the costs of the expedition.[19] Shirkuh used the money to hire 6000 Turkish cavalrymen from the Yaruquis tribe.[20] News of Shirkuh's advance into Egypt led Amalric to regroup his forces and vainly attempt to prevent Shirkuh from crossing the Nile.[21] Amalric realized that Shawar's delaying tactics had produced this shift in the balance of power and, therefore, the Latins withdrew to Palestine in January 1169. Shirkuh had arrived in Egypt to assist Shawar; yet, within a few weeks, he had Shawar murdered and assumed full control over Egypt. With 8000 horsemen and 500 Mamluks and Kurds, Shirkuh occupied the administrative and military centers of Egypt while distributing land to his troops.[22] By March, however, Shirkuh died from overeating and was succeeded by Saladin.[23]

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[19] H. A. R. Gibb, "The Armies of Saladin," Cahiers d'Histoire Egyptienne, III (May, 1951), 304.

[20] Ibid. Their leader was Aineddawla Yaruquis.

[21] WT, XX, 9, 356.

[22] Gibb., op. cit., pp. 304-305.

[23] WT, XX, 4-5, 347-351. A Kurdish clan had risen to prominence under Zengi and Nūr-ad-Dīn. Two brothers of this clan, Ayub and Shirkuh, began their careers in Iraq where the former governed the city of Takrit for the Abbasid caliph. Involved in an assassination plot, the family moved westward. Shirkuh joined with Zengi while his older brother served the Burid ruler of Damascus as governor of Baalbek. Later, when Nūr-ad-Dīn and his lieutenant Shirkuh besieged Damascus, Ayub commanded the Damascene forces. After the Aleppan victory, Ayyub was entrusted with control of Damascus by Nūr-ad-Dīn while Shirkuh governed Homs and was joined there by his nephew, Saladin. Saladin assisted his uncle on the several Egyptian canpaigns and succeeded him in power.

2. The Byzantine Alliance

The moment seemed opportune for the Franks to restore their influence in Egypt since Saladin had yet to consolidate his position. A joint Franco-Egyptian military expedition to conquer and partition Egypt was discussed after Amalric's marriage to Manuel I's grand-niece in August 1167. The Byzantine ruler's far-reaching plans called for expansion in all directions, especially southward. Two imperial envoys - Count Alexander of Gravina and Michael Hydruntinus (Otranto) - brought the Byzantine plan, or rejoinder to Amalric's earlier suggestion for a joint Egyptian venture, in the summer of 1168. William of Tyre was sent to negotiate the alliance with the emperor.[24] The alliance's urgency is attested to by the archbishop's immediate journey to the emperor's military headquarters conducting operations against the Serbs where the details were prepared. Egyptian-Damascene secret negotiations to eliminate the Frankish presence in Egypt had begun and certainly influenced the Frankish decision. Baronial interest in delivering the final blow to Egypt at a moment when her defenses were weak was supported by Gilbert d'Assailly's Hospitallers. Philip de Milly's Templar forces opposed any precipitate action and withdrew their assistance from the campaign. Amalric's succumbing to the baronial pressure is a further reflection on the weakness of the royal position.

In 1169, however, the Franks saw the necessity for a joint effort and plans were made to attack the port city of Damietta.[25] After a delayed start, the expedition arrived at the well fortified city on October 27 and began to build siege machines while awaiting the fleet. The ships had been delayed by bad weather.[26] Again the Latins unnecessarily delayed the start of hostilities and, as a result, Saladin was able to reinforce the city with ships and men.[27] The Greek supplies dwindled,[28] while tactical errors such as the positioning of siege machinery against the strongest portion of the city's walls and the damaging of a chapel dedicated to the Virgin Mary were committed.[29] Morale decreased and it became evident that the campaign had failed. A peace was concluded by the Franks and agreed to by the imperial generals in December.[30] The Latin army returned to the protection of Ascalon prior to Christmas day; the fleet, however, suffered shattering destruction from a storm at sea before the remnants returned to Constantinople. Saladin was left in full control of Egypt.

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[24] WT, XX, 4-5, 347-351.

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25. Ibid., 13, 361-362.
26. Ibid., 15, 363
27. Ibid., 364.
28. Runciman, op. cit., pp. 386-388; WT, XX, 16, 366-368.
29. Ibid.
30. WT, XX, 16, 368.

3. Military Operations to the Death of Amalric

Nūr-ad-Dīn's doubt concerning Saladin's loyalty was a probable factor in the sending of a large caravan from Damascus to Cairo in April 1170. The Syrian leader was anxious to maintain his overlordship of the Arab forces in Egypt. Many merchants from Damascus took part in this trading venture as evidenced by Nūr-ad-Dīn's attack on the fortress of Krak in order to protect the caravan's passage;[31] the Syrian leader had not moved against the Franks during the Egyptian campaign so that his involvement now may be taken as evidence of the importance of the convoy and the merchants who took part. Heading the Syrian troops accompanying the caravan was Najm-ed-Din Ayub, Saladin's father and a devoted follower of Nūr-ad-Dīn.

Saladin next prepared his first attack on the Latin Kingdom from his Egyptian base. As a prelude to this attack, Saladin lay siege to the fortress of Darum guarding the southern Frankish coast. Well defended by Anselm de Pass before overwhelming odds,[32] Darum managed to hold out until the royal reinforcements arrived. Amalric had hastened from Ascalon with his cavalry and infantry on December 18 and marched first to Gaza.[33] Leaving Miles de Plancy to defend Gaza, Amalric and the Templars who had been stationed there, together with the Patriarch and the relic of the Cross, raised the siege of Darum. Saladin quickly marched to Gaza and gained entry to the lower town after destroying the meager local force which Miles de Plancy had unexplainedly refused the protection of the citadel.[34] The town's inhabitants were massacred but the stronghold was not taken. Saladin then withdrew toward the Egyptian border ending the campaign.

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[31] Beha-ad-Din, pp. 59-60; Abu Shama, pp. 153-154; Ibn-al-Athir, Atabegs, pp. 260-261.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.

In 1171, Saladin prepared to invade the Crusader Kingdom once again. Expeditions were arranged to attack the Gulf of Akaba and the port of Aila and the fortress of Krak. Finding that Amalric was conducting his armies on a misdirected search for the Egyptian forces,[35] Saladin entered the kingdom and attacked the fortress of Montreal, southeast of the Dead Sea. The castle and the town were amply provisioned and well defended, however, thereby forcing Saladin to abandon the siege.[36]

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[34] Ibid., XX, 20, 374-375. William of Tyre identifies some of the defenders as lightly armed youth from the village of Mahumaria (La Grande Mahomerie).

[35] Ibid., XX, 27, 388. William of Tyre notes that the Latins decided in council to avoid a direct confrontation and, therefore, marched hither and thither - Beersheba to Ascalon to Darum to Beersheba - without engaging Saladin.

[36] Ibid., p. 389; Runciman, op. cit., III, 394-395 and n. 1, uses the Arabic sources (Ibn-al-Athir, pp. 581-583 and Atabegs, pp. 286-288; Kemal-ad-Din, ed. Blochet, p. 552; Maqrizi, ed. Blochet, p. 506; Beha-ad-Din, P.P.T.S., pp. 62-63) to state that Nūr-ad-Dīn's approach led Saladin to abandon the siege and return to Cairo. Stevenson, The Crusaders in the East, pp. 201-202 notes the similarities in William of Tyre's description of the campaigns of 1171 and 1173 and questions William's accuracy. Runciman (p. 395, n. 1) questions Beha-ad-Din's accuracy relating to these campaigns.

Again, in the summer of 1173, Nūr-ad-Dīn entered the Latin Kingdom while calling on Saladin to assist.[37] The attack centered upon the fortress of Krak, somewhat unprepared since the lord, Miles de Plancy, was campaigning with Amalric in Armenia.[38] The Constable of the Kingdom, Humphrey II of Toron,[39] assembled the remaining forces in the kingdom and, accompanied by Ralph, Bishop of Bethlehem, to whom the relic of the Cross had been entrusted, hastened to relieve the defenders. Nūr-ad-Dīn withdrew from the attack at this point.

The developments of the Egyptian navy, vital in Moslem military operations, should now be examined.[40] Saladin's accession to power in 1169 found Egypt with a very small navy. Cyprus and Crete, which had been advanced bases earlier in the century, had fallen under the control of Byzantium. Furthermore, the consolidation of the Crusader Kingdom had brought about the loss of the Syrian coastal cities which had played so important a role as commercial ports and refitting stations for Egypt's fleet. The Latins' capture of the Red Sea coastal city of Aila in 1116 under Baldwin I,[41] and Ascalon in 1153 under Baldwin III presaged the southerly campaign to be followed by Amalric I.[42] The dwindling of the naval outposts brought a corresponding decrease in the strength of Egypt and the attacks of the Norman fleet on Tanis, Rosetta, Alexandria and Damietta in 1154-1155 illustrate the Egyptian naval inadequacy.[43] The surprise attack by the Norman fleet of sixty vessels yielded great treasure which the Sicilians retained after defeating the fleets of Byzantium, Egypt and the newly formed state of the Almohads in separate engagements.[44]

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[37] Ibn-al-Athir, pp. 587-593 and *Atabegs*, p. 293; Kemal-ad-Din, p. 553; Maqrizi, pp. 509-511.

[38] WT, XX, 26, 387-388.

[39] Humphrey had been the father-in-law of the heiress of Krak, Stephenie de Milly, since his son had been married to her; his early death led Stephanie to select Miles de Plancy as her second husband. Miles was Amalric's Seneschal.

[40] A. S. Ehrenkreutz, "The Place of Saladin in the Naval History of the Mediterranean in the Middle Ages," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, LXXV (1955), 100-116, provides a wealth of information on this subject.

The port city of Alexandria was blocked by Frankish ships in 1167, as previously noted. In 1168, Amalric launched an offensive against Egypt designed to gain control of the faltering Fatimid lands. Sea control enabled Amalric to utilize a land-sea operation against the Egyptians.[45] The apparently small Frankish fleet entered the Nile at the

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[41] WT, XI, 29, 513. Aila was recaptured in December 1170 by Saladin (Ibn-al-Athir, pp. 577-578) and held until 1182 when Reynald de Châtillon captured the port city, built a fleet and raided caravans, coastal cities and Mecca (Abu Shama, pp. 231-235; Ibn-al-Athir, p. 658; Maqrizi, ROL, XI, 500-501; Ernoul, pp. 69-70 mentions the raid as a scientific expedition).

[42] WT, XVII, 7, 195 and 21-30, 225-234.

[43] Ehrenkreutz, op. cit., pp. 101-103; Helene Wieruszowski, "The Norman Kingdom of Sicily and the Crusades," A History of the Crusades, II (1962), 30.

[44] Wieruszowski, op. cit., p. 30.

[45] WT, XX, 8, 353-354; Beha-ad-Din, p. 52.

Tanitic branch,[46] raided and ravaged Tanis, adding to the fear of the Franks already held by the Egyptians after the destruction of Bilbais a few days earlier. Yet, the Egyptians held out until the advance of Shirkuh's forces led Amalric to retreat to the Latin Kingdom by January 2, 1169.[47]

Egypt was besieged once again in October 1169 by the Byzantine Frankish expedition previously mentioned.[48] The imperial fleet was under the direction of Grand Duke Andronicus Contostephanus,[49] assisted by Alexander of Conversana and Theodore Maurozumes. Sailing from Constantinople after July 10, 1169, the imperial fleet was to provide the Christians with control of the sea.[50] The vast armada included armored landing craft designed to deposit both men and horses on the coast by means of stern openings and movable bridges.[51]

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[46] William of Tyre (XX, 8, 353) calls the branch, Carabes. The size of the fleet may be considered as small owing to the opposition to the entire campaign by the Templars (XX, 5, 350-351) on behalf of their commercial involvements with Egypt at this time. Also, the fleet was blocked from further passage up the Nile by a group of Egyptian vessels; this would imply that its size was too small to force passage.

[47] WT, XX, 9, 356.

[48] *Ibid.*, 13-17, 361-370; Nicetas Choniates, *Historia*, *C.S.H.B.* (Bonn, 1835), pp. 208-209.

[49] Babcock and Krey have incorrectly given the *megalducas* the name Alexius (vol. II, 361, n. 23).

[50] F. Chalandon, *Les Commène*, II: *Jean II Commène (1118-1143) et Manuel I Commène (1143-1180)* (Paris, 1912), 538.

[51] WT, XX, 13, 361.

The Greek and Latin forces marched overland from Ascalon on October 16, 1169.[52] They reached the Pelusium sea entrance to the Nile nine days later, were ferried across by the awaiting fleet and appeared before Damietta two days later. The fleet was delayed for three days by stormy weather, final~~ly~~ reaching its river positions on October 30 but finding the river blocked by a large iron chain. The inadequate defenses of Damietta invited a quick Christian attack but the leaders delayed, for which they were bitterly reproached by William of Tyre.[53] Troops and provisions were rushed into the city from Cairo; the Greek fleet, blocked by the well-defended river chain, was unable to sail upstream and prevent this reinforcement. Since a siege was now necessary, the allied forces began to build the needed war machines: siege towers, rock catapults, housing to protect the sappers and battering rams. With great cunning, the defenders countered with their own catapults and, taking advantage of favorable winds, they launched a fire boat into the midst of the fleet. Only the vigilance of Amalric prevented the destruction of the entire fleet.[54] the king quickly aroused the sailors to protect their ships so that only six galleys were lost. Inadequately provisioned for a long campaign, the imperial forces were faced with a food shortage; unable to obtain provisions from the Latins, the Greeks foraged the countryside for the date palms and ate oats, raisins and chestnuts. Heavy rainfall increased the distress in the allied camp and negotiations to end the hostilities were begun.[55] The terms of this treaty remained secret although the Latins probably received some payment as well as the right to enter Damietta and trade.[56] The army returned to Ascalon on December 21, 1169 but the fleet was hard hit by a storm and only a small portion returned to their Bosporus ports. No further combined campaigns against Egypt were to be carried out after this Saladin now rested as master of Egypt while planning to complete Shirkuh and Nūr-ad-Dīn's goal of union with Syria.

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[52] WT, XX, 14, 362. Baldwin uses October 15, the date set for the troops to assemble, as the date of departure (A History of the Crusades, I, 557).

[53] WT, XX, 15, 364; Runciman, op. cit., p. 387, attributes the delay to Amalric's being "awed by the huge fortifications."

[54] Ibid., 16, 366-367.

Egypt's successful defense of Damietta led to a brief period of peace on the Mediterranean. Between 1170 and 1173, no major naval engagement between the Latins and Egypt took place. The peace ended in 1174 when Alexandria was blockaded and her defenses ineffectively penetrated by the land and sea forces amassed for the operations planned by William II of Sicily.[57] The attack illustrates the weakened state of Egypt's naval ability: the Alexandrians had to use the final preventive of sinking all ships in the harbor in order to obstruct the Normans' land-sea attack. The formidable fleet of over two hundred ships transporting 30,000 soldiers, knights and Turcopole cavalry was insufficient for capturing a city of Alexandria's size; this would lend credence to the view that William counted on the combined actions of his forces, the rebellion of the Egyptian Shiite nobility and the invasion of Egypt by the Frankish army under Amalric.[58] The defeat did not end William's harassment of Egypt, however, and 1175-1176 were marked by Norman raids on Egypt's export center on the Nile delta, Tanis.

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[55] Runciman, op. cit., p. 388, n. 1, incorrectly states that William of Tyre attributed the armistice negotiations to Andronicus - see WT, XX, 14-17, 362-370. The Greek historians; Cinnamus, op. cit., pp. 278-280 and Choniates, op. cit., pp. 209-219, find the Latins to be at fault in this campaign. William of Tyre's treatment of this campaign evidences a similar attitude in that he implies that the Latins were unwilling to share the possible fruits of their victories with the Greeks. This is also the rationale behind the disastrous campaign in 1168. On the other hand, William's involvement in the Byzantine treaty negotiations may have colored his remarks.

[56] WT, XX, 16-17, 368.

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[57] The entire subject of the campaign of 1174 would appear to warrant closer scrutiny of the information to be found in: WT, XXI, 3, 399; Abu Shama, pp. 164-165; Beha-ad-Din, *P.P.T.S.*, pp. 66-67; Ibn-al-Athir, *R.H.C.*, *Or.*, I, 599-602, 611-614; F. Chalandon, *Histoire de la domination normande en Italie et en Sicilie* (Paris, 1907), II, 394-398; H. A. R. Gibb, "The Rise of Saladin, 1169-1189," *A History of the Crusades*, I (1955), 566; Ehrenkreutz, *op. cit.*,; Runciman, *op. cit.*, p. 403; M. Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani di Sicilia* (2nd ed., Catania, 1933-1939), III, 515-524; Wieruszowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-36. All sources except Ehrenkreutz agree that the attack accomplished little, if anything; Ehrenkreutz states that the 1174 campaign was a severe blow to the Egyptian naval defenses, thereby influencing Saladin's interest in rebuilding the navy. Gibb alleges that Saladin received Byzantine warning of an impending attack and was, therefore, delayed in joining the race to divide Nūr-ad-Dīn's empire. Chalandon notes that the assault failed because Frankish help did not materialize after Amalric's death (p. 396). William of Tyre places the blame on the incautious actions of the Sicilian leaders. Runciman supports Chalandon's view adding that William wanted to succeed where Manuel I had failed in 1169. Wieruszowski's detailed examination concludes that since the besieging force was insufficient, the siege was a rashly executed one in which the besieged quickly routed their attackers. The dating of the campaign varies: William of Tyre notes an assault "about the beginning of August" lasting five or six days; Chalandon chooses July 28-August 1; Runciman extends the attack to July 25; Beha-ad-Dīn has the arrival dated September 7; Wieruszowski accepts Amari's dating of July 28 through the morning of August 2 (p. 35); R. Grousset, *Histoire des Croisades*, II: *Monarchie franque et monarchie musulmane: l'équilibre* (Paris, 1955), 594-597 and 617-619, prefers the work of Imad-ad-Dīn over that of Beha-ad-Dīn and sets the time period at July 28-August 1 with the trapped remnants of the Sicilian force holding out until massacred on August 2-3.

Saladin, concerned with this naval weakness, actively proceeded to strengthen his forces. The pay of the sailors was increased and shipbuilding techniques and material were purchased from the Pisans. The period 1171-1187 witnessed Saladin's westward expansion across North Africa; designed to increase the security of the Egyptian holdings, this push also allowed Saladin to obtain the lumber necessary for his ships and to man them with the superior North African sailors. This methodical rebuilding was rewarded by the naval successes in the 1179 campaign against the Crusaders' coastline;the revitalized fleet sacked Acre on October 14 and returned to

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[58] Wieruszowski, op. cit., p. 35 notes that Saladin secretly eliminated the nobles in April and Amalric died on July 11, just prior to the launching of the invasion, thereby taking the advantage away from the Christians; Chalandon, op. cit., II, 395 and Grousset, op. cit., II, 617-619 further support this explanation.

Egypt laden with treasure and prisoners. Saladin's policy had restored Islamic strength on the sea.[59]

Nūr-ad-Dīn died quite suddenly on May 15, 1174 and Amalric quickly took advantage of the situation by besieging Banyas in June. Nūr-ad-Dīn's widow requested a truce but the Latins continued to press their siege until they became convinced that it would stand little chance of success.[60] The Damascene reinforcements under the emir Ibn-al-Muqaddam decided the issue for Amalric and he accepted a large sum of money and the release of twenty captured knights.[61] In 1171, Amalric and his advisors despaired of receiving massive European assistance. The sole option now available for the crusaders lay in renewing the Franco-Byzantine alliance negotiated in 1168. Amalric sailed to Constantinople from Acre on March 10. The Byzantine ruler and Outremer's king and envoys spent a great deal of timein discussions, entertainment, touring the historic places and exchanging gifts. The alliance was renewed but was destined not to initiate any action: anti-Byzantine developments in Cilician Armenia and Iconium along with Nūr-ad-Dīn's intervention busied the Byzantine ruler; the Templar's murder of the Assassin envoy negated any possible planned Nizari-Latin alliance; Saladin's 1171 replacing of the Shiite influence in Egyptian prayers united Islam under the Sunnite banner and eliminated the schismatic conflict which had allowed the original crusader inroads; Nūr-ad-Dīn's death in May 1174 eliminated the power struggle preventing Saladin's freedom of action and initiated the latter's decade of political struggling for total Islamic control; Amalric's death in July 1174, to be discussed below, brought the never-begun alliance to an end.

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[59] Ehrenkreutz, op. cit., pp. 113-116.

[60] WT, XX, 31, 394-395.

[61] Ibid; Runciman, op. cit., p. 399 notes that all Christian knights in Damascus were freed and that an alliance against Saladin was prepared.

On his return to the kingdom from the Banyas siege, Amalric fell ill with dysentery; he slowly rode to Jerusalem by way of Tiberias, Nazareth and Nablus. While the dysentery was temporarily abated, the king's fever continued to climb until he personally requested purgation from the Greek, Syrian and other eastern physicians in attendance. They would not, however, agree to this drastic measure. Amalric, therefore, could only receive this remedy after absolving the Frankish physician of blame for the results.[62] The purgative technique lowered the king's temperature for a few days but, in his weakened condition, Amalric was unable to withstand a recurrence of the illness.[63] At the age of thirty-eight, with the opportunity to challenge the power of Islam before him, he died on July 11, 1174. The road to domination of the East was now opened for Saladin.

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[62] WT, XX, 31, 395-396.

[63] Suleman-ibn-Daoud was probably the Syrian physician in attendance. See C. Cahen, "Indigènes et Croisés," Syria (1943). It would appear correct to assume that Frankish medicine was inferior to that of the natives; Usama-ibn-Munqidh (ed. Hitti, pp. 161-170) was aghast at the crude techniques employed in Frankish practice, although he noted that the Westerners had developed a cure for scrofula.

CONCLUSION

Perhaps the basis for the weakness of the Jerusalemite kingdom was its structural organization, particularly the conditions of vassalage and the feudal relations resulting therefrom. Royal power was restricted, as has been shown, since the barons enforced their consultative rights whenever decisions affecting the kingdom's actions arose. Baronial election of the rulers had mellowed into a somewhat casual acceptance of the hereditary trend, but had not disappeared entirely. Constant reaffirmation of the rights of the barons was shown by their regular approval of the regents selected for the kingdom. Sitting in their assembly, the Haute Cour - a transplanted curia regis, the barons constituted the actual controlling power in the land. From their supra-royal position, the barons maintained a loose management of the juridico-legislative functions of the state. The assemblage of nobles prior to each campaign contributed to the lack of military efficiency by divisive debates and politically oriented support for one or another noble faction. The almost supra-royal position of the military orders served as another weakening element in the kingdom's structure. Against this information, the earlier interpretation stressing royal strength must be suspect.

The Assise sur la ligece, viewed against the baronial political influence and the desire to assure the Kingdom's military security, no longer stands as support for a strong monarch interpretation of twelfth century Outremer. The earlier Assise de Teneüre and the conflicting Assise de Vente have been shown to have been directed at maintaining the state's military needs. The circumventive nature of the latter towards the former conditioned Amalric's Assise sur la ligece and its baronial approval. That this baronial acceptance was directed at ending the royal right to dispossess vassals without the judgment of the Haute Cour has been examined. Finally, it would appear that Amalric served not as a strong ruler but rather as a participant in, and sometimes leader of, baronial political decisions.

Well aware of both baronial and royal rights and customs, Amalric was a man hardened to warfare. Perhaps less affable than his brother, Baldwin III, Amalric's eagerness to discuss ideas with his followers brought him respect. His personal courage and capable use of military tactics maintained the royal dignity amidst rising baronial importance. Amalric's studied application of the administrative, financial and military policies of his predecessors should assure for him recognition as a ruler under whom the Latin Kingdom momentarily reached for stability by seeking to secure its southern borders while effecting a Byzantine alliance to protect the north. Given the chaotic descent of Outremer politics following his death, Amalric must be properly credited for the energy and vision which created the efforts at achieving stability which the preceding pages have described.

ABBREVIATIONS

BFLUS = *Bulletin de la Faculté des Lettres de Strasbourg*

H. Cr. = *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades* (*Occ*. = *Historiens Occidentaux*; *Orient* = *Historiens Occidentaux*).

PPTS = *Palestine Pilgrims Text Society*.

RHD = *Revue de l'histoire du Droit*.

RHDFE = *Revue historique de Droit français et étranger*.

ROL = *Revue de l'Orient Latin*.

WT = William of Tyre, *Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum* (*H. Cr*., *Occ*., I and tr. E. A. Babcock and A. C. Krey, *A History of Deeds Done Beyond the Sea: by William Archbishop of Tyre*, Columbia Univ., New York, 1943).

BIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

A suitable arrangement for the analysis of source materials is one of dividing the material according to the authors' backgrounds. For the study of Amalric I's reign, this arrangement provides the major divisions of Latin, Greek, Arabic and other sources.

The major source for the Latin viewpoint is the chronicle of William of Tyre. A well-educated man familiar with the Latin Orient and the Mediterranean world, William rose rapidly in official circles, becoming Chancellor of the kingdom between 1170 and 1174. His writings began in 1169 and continued until his death. For the period between 1127 and 1160, his material was drawn from royal archives and several chronicles. His reliability for this period is, therefore, open to question. Yet, William does display a watchful awareness of developments around him and the position they occupied in the scope of history.

The principal sources for William of Tyre include:

1. Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum a tempore successorum Mahometh usque ad annum Domini MCLXXIV in Recueil des Historiens des croisades, ed. Hase, Quatremère, Reinaud, Guérard, Beugnot (Paris, 1841-1906); translated by E. A. Babcock and A. C. Krey, A History of Deeds Done Beyond the Sea: by William Archbishop of Tyre (Columbia University: New York, 1943).

2. Guillaume de Tyr et ses continuateurs (Paulin: Paris, 1879-1880) derived from a thirteenth century

French translation.

3. *Chronique d'Ernoul et de Bernard le Trésorier*, ed. Mas-Latrie (Société de l'histoire de France: Paris, 1871) early sections of this alleged continuation of William of Tyre's chronicle are useful for the period between 1163 and 1174.
4. *L'Estoire d'Eracles, Empereur* in *Recueil des Historiens des croisades*, *Historiens Occidentaux*, II provides a continuation of William's chronicle.

Principal Latin sources for the period of crusade history involved in this study include:

1. *Recueil des Historiens des croisades, Historiens Occidentaux* (5 volumes, 1844-1895).
2. *Palestine Pilgrims Text Society* (13 volumes, London, 1890-1897), V: translation of John of Wurzburg's *Description of the Holy Land* (1160-1170s), John Phocas' pilgrimage (1185) and Theodoric's *Description of the Holy Places* (1172); XI: translation of extracts from Jacques de Vitry's *History of Jerusalem* (1180).
3. Reinhold Röhricht, *Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani, 1097-1291* (Innsbruck, 1895) and *Additamentum* (1904); reprinted B. Franklin, New York, 1963.
4. *Lettres des rois, princes et prélats de Terre Sainte au roi Louis VII* in *Patrologia Latina*, ed. Migne (Paris, 1884-1892), t. 155, col. 1265-1282.

The Greek historians discuss the Latin crusaders only when they come into direct contact with Byzantium. For the reigns of John (1118-1143) and Manuel I Comnenus (1143-1180) the basic works are the chronicles of John Cinnamus and Nicetas Choniates. Cinnamus was Manuel's secretary and his history was begun shortly after Manuel's death. Choniates deals with the period from John's rule to the fall of Constantinople to the Latins.

Principal sources include:

1. *John Cinnamus: Epitome Historiarum* in *Recueil des Historiens des croisades*, *Historiens Grecs* (2 volumes, 1875-1881), ed. Hase and Alexandre, and in *Patrologiae graecae cursus completus . . .* , ed. Migne (Paris, 1857), CXXX and in *Corpus Scriptorum historiae byzantinae*, ed. I. Bekker (Bonn, 1836).

2. *Nicetas Choniates: Historia* in *RHC*, *H. Grec* and in *CSHB* (Bonn, 1835).

3. *Anna Comnena: The Alexiad* in *CSHB*, VI (Bonn, 1839) and ed. B. Lieb (Paris, 1937-1945) and ed. E. Dawes (London, 1928).

Arabic sources increased as the twelfth century closed and the thirteenth century began. Their chief concern was with the narration of military and political developments so that they dealt with the Latin crusaders only as they fit into the Arab view. Principal sources include:

1. *Recueil des Historiens des croisades*, *Historiens Orientaux* (5 volumes, Paris, 1872-1906) contains translated extracts conveying meaning of Arabic authors.

2. *Ibn-al-Athir: Al-kamil fi-t-ta'rikh* in *RHG*, *H. Orientaux*, I (Paris, 1872), 187-744. The author (1160-1233) wrote a careful and critical historical compendium from 1098-1190.

3. *Ibn-al-Athir: History of the Atabegs of Mosul* in *RHC*, *H. Orientaux*, II (Paris, 1876), ed. de Slane and de Meynard detailing the period 1084-1211.

4. Ibn-Shaddad's chronicle of the life of Saladin (to 1193), Kamal-al-Din's chronicle of the history of Aleppo (also translated E. Blochet, *Histoire d'Alep*, in *Revue de l'Orient Latin*, II-VI, 1894-1898) and extracts from his biographies of Nūr-ad-Dīn and Alp Arslan in *RHC*, *H. Orientaux*, III (Paris, 1884).

5. *Abu-Shamah: Book of the Two Gardens* in *RHC*, *H. Orientaux*, IV (Paris, 1898), ed. de Meynard and V (Paris, 1906) chronicles the reigns of Nūr-ad-Dīn and Saladin (1146-1191), including the weakening of the Latin Kingdom prior to the defeat at Hattin. The author (1203-1251) is a fairly reliable witness.

6. Ibn-al Qalanisi: The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusaders translated extracts (ed. H. A. R. Gibb, London, 1932).
7. Usamah-ibn-Munqidh: An Arab-Syrian Gentleman in the Period of the Crusades (translated P. K. Hitti, Columbia University: New York, 1929) noting aristocratic life of Moslems and Franks.

The Syrian and Armenian sources follow the same trend as that noted above for the Arabic sources. Principal sources include:

1. Recueil des Historiens des croisades, Documents Arménians (2 volumes, Paris, 1869-1906), ed. Dulaurier, Schéfer, de Mas-Latrie, Riant, Kohler, containing extracts from the chronicle of Michael the Syrian (Jacobite patriarch of Antioch) covering the period 1011-1205, from the chronicle of Varian le Grand covering the period 1163-1221, from the chronicle of Sempad covering the history of Lesser Armenia for the period 1092-1333 and the Gestes des Chiprois covering the period 1132-1224.
2. Abul Faraj (Gregory) Bar Hebraeus: Chronography (ed. W. W. Budge, Oxford, 1932).
3. Chronique de Michel le Syrien (ed. J. B. Chabot, 4 volumes, Paris, 1899-1910).
4. The Itinerary of Benjamin of Tudela (ed. M. N. Adler, London, 1907).
5. The Chronicles of Joseph Ben Joshua Ben Meir (translated C. H. F. Bialloblotsky, London, 1836).

Sources dealing with the assizes, the military orders and documentary background include:

1. Recueil des Historiens des croisades, Lois (2 volumes, Paris, 1841-1843), ed. Beugnot contains the works of Jean and Jacques d'Ibelin, the Livre au Roy and La Clef des Assises de la Haute Cour du Royaume de Jerusalem et Chypre and political documents relating to questions of succession and regency, military service and family lineage.
2. Cartulaire général de l'ordre du Temple, 1119-1150 (ed. M. d'Albon, Paris, 1913-1922).

3. *Cartulaire de l'Eglise de Saint-Sépulchre de Jérusalem* (ed. E. de Rozière, Paris, 1849).

4. *Cartulaire général de l'ordre des Hospitaliers de Saint-Jean de Jérusalem* (ed. J. Delaville Le Roulx, Paris, 1894-1906).

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